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Last winter my aunt sent me a blue photo album in the mail. I had emailed her because I
had to write an analysis of a photographic archive, any archive, for a class I was taking. We had
been encouraged to find something personal, and my dad told me his sister, if anyone, had become the family historian: she had the pictures, the storage boxes, the stories. A few days later I
got a package in the mail with the album bubble-wrapped inside. It looked inexpensive, like
something you could pick up at a drugstore, with a cover made of crumbling blue construction
paper decorated with two hand-stenciled blocks of text filled in with marker. “PLG” reads the
first, my grandfather’s initials, and below it “1973!”: the year in which it was made and given, a
fiftieth birthday present from his sister.
The pages hold black and white photos of my grandfather and his sisters sledding in Devon, Pennsylvania, the town where he grew up (and for which I’m named); lined up on ponies in
a neighbor’s yard; standing with their parents on a steamliner. There are letters my grandfather
wrote her from Wyoming, where he worked on a ranch for a summer, and then pictures of him
escorting dressed-up dates down staircases, with cryptic allusions to relationships gone wrong.
She kept a newspaper clipping from his time at Yale, titled “90 Tapped at Yale In Traditional
Rites of Senior Societies,” with his name listed under Elihu, and then postcards he sent her from
Marine Corps. training camps and, later, his stations overseas. But the last letter was postmarked
from 1948, and there’s nothing left until a final picture, which my aunt guesses comes from a
few years later. In it my grandfather sits in a suit, smiling at the camera, with my great-aunt’s
cursive written overhead: “Where am I?” in blue ink.1

1

See Appendix A.
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I was curious about where he went, and why the album stopped, so I started looking
around the internet. Up came a finding aid to the Philip L. Geyelin Papers housed at the Library
of Congress, which held 127 boxes of files my grandmother donated in 2005, the year after his
death. The third page held a short biographical note, written as a timeline. In 1943, it says, he
graduated with a B.A. from Yale. 1943 to 1946, he served in the Marines. 1946 to 1947, he was a
journalist for the Washington Bureau of the Associated Press. 1947 to 1967, he was a foreign
correspondent for the Wall Street Journal. And then 1950-1951: “Worked for Central Intelligence
Agency while on leave from Wall Street Journal.” I’d had no idea.
I’d grown up knowing of my grandfather as a journalist, and an important journalist: an
editorialist at the Washington Post, and the winner of the 1970 Pulitzer for his antiwar writing on
Vietnam. He died when I was ten, so the best image I have of him comes from a poster my dad
hung in the bathroom next to his kitchen, something the Post put it together after he won his
Pulitzer. It’s a collage of black and white photographs featuring him in various poses: looking at
the camera with a pipe in his mouth, wry behind his glasses; gesturing while on the phone, leaning back in his chair. A quote runs across it: “Some people say that the whole point of an editorial
is where you wind up. I think the point is how you get there. If you do that part right, the conclusion suggests itself—you don’t have to shout it from a mountain top.”2
My dad was a journalist, too; he met my mom, also a journalist, at the St. Petersburg
Times; later, she met my stepdad at the Bergen Record, where he was an editor. So I grew up with
the newspaper on the table in the mornings, where it stayed until I set the table for dinner. I remember the moral outrage over A Million Little Pieces or the Jayson Blair scandal—two breach-

2
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es of journalistic integrity—in the same way as I remember presidential elections, or talks of another unpopular war.
So I was shocked to read that my grandfather, an almost folkloric family icon of journalism at its hardest-hitting and most critical of the government, had worked for the CIA at the beginning of his reporting career. The two positions—journalist and CIA member, or employee, or
agent—seemed violently opposed. Weren’t they, in a certain way, enemies? How could someone
go from engaging with one to engaging with the other?
That last question fueled my next few weeks of obsessive combing through online conspiracy theories. If you Google “Phil Geyelin CIA,” the screen fills up with links to pages presenting him as part of a cohort of men tied together in a Venn diagram of media and intelligence,
whose overlap is the manufacturing of Cold War propaganda distributed both in the U.S. and
abroad. The first link took me to www.whokilledjfk.net, which told me CIA memos had listed
my grandfather as “a CIA resource” and “a willing collaborator” during his almost twenty-year
career at the Wall Street Journal. Later, it says, he protested Congressional efforts to police relationships between the CIA and the media.3 The next link took me to a page about All the Publisher’s Men, a “suppressed book” from the 1980s about Post publisher Katharine Graham’s ties
to the agency. The page claimed “informed readers” could still observe my grandfather's CIAfriendly filtration of the news in the writing he was still publishing by the eighties. 4 The most
understated paragraph of another page, “Operation Mockingbird: CIA Media Manipulation,” said

3

“CIA and the Media,” Who Killed JFK?, accessed April 6, 2016, http://www.whokilledjfk.net/
cia_and_the_media.htm.
Daniel Brandt, “All the Publisher’s Men,” The National Reporter, Fall 1987, accessed April 6,
2016, http://www.namebase.org/davis.html.
4
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that the CIA began a “secret project,” Mockingbird, in the late forties, intending to buy influence
at major media organizations. Journalists were paid to be spies, and to disseminate information;
and one of the masterminds, its claims, was a Post publisher. That one devoted a whole paragraph to my grandfather. 5
The websites were surprising—I’d never heard any mention of any of it—but they also
looked like the sort of “evidence” cooked up for the same audience who posted on internet forums about UFO sightings, or assassination plots. I thought the details, if any were true, had to
have been exaggerated, or taken out of context, or spun. What I knew about my grandfather from
the fifties, sixties, and seventies was that he was a high-powered journalist at the Post credited
with shifting the paper’s editorial stance against the Vietnam War; and that he’d supported the
Post’s publication of the Pentagon Papers and Watergate investigations. I understood that work
as quite explicitly anti-government, or at least not in the government’s interest.
That didn’t seem to fit a narrative of covert media manipulation, or corrupt government
influence. At the same time, the images I have of him and my grandmother fit the images of the
“old boy network” most of the theories put forward. I knew him to have been part of an elite
D.C. social scene where ambassadors came for dinner parties, the women wore pearls, and the
men came from the Ivy League. Other albums my aunt has since given me show pictures of him
taking shots with dignitaries, or having picnics in linen suits all over the European countryside.
My lasting images of my grandmother, who passed away in 2009, hold her orange-lipsticked and
laughing at the head of the table: either in my memory, hosting my family, or in pictures, hosting

Mary Louise, “Operation Mockingbird: CIA Media Manipulation,” The Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, accessed April 6, 2016, http://www.apfn.org/apfn/mockingbird.htm.
5
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whoever they considered interesting and important. She was once featured in a Vogue spread
with the headline, “12 people for dinner: 24 hours notice,” and the images show her in a headscarf at the grocery store, and then holding court over a guest list including ambassadors and
their wives.6 I know the family story where my teenaged dad and aunt convinced their parents to
smoke weed with them, just once. My grandfather got high, and then Kissinger called the house,
something that apparently wasn't atypical. I’m told they talked about foreign policy.7
That image of an interwoven world of powerful men working in media, or the government, was corroborated by sources more reputable, to me, than online conspiracy forums. Recently published books—The Georgetown Set, The Georgetown Ladies’ Social Club—present a
similar scene. So do members of my family, and the friends they grew up with. Women, I’m told,
were charged with creating the environments where information could be shared. Dinner parties
might have confidential-only tables. Media and government mingled. It was a big clique, they
told me; but that doesn’t mean it was corrupt.8
I’ve spent the past year trying to understand my grandfather in terms of that clique, and
that time. I sat for hot D.C. weekdays in the Library of Congress, where I looked through the 127
boxes they kept of his old letters, memos, notes, drafts, and photographs; I read his published
writing while sitting in Yale libraries he once sat in, too. I stayed for summer weekends at my
aunt and uncle’s house in Virginia, looking through the boxes they kept in the attic, full of files
no one donated to the Library. I went to the National Archives, to see what the CIA kept on him
“12 People for Dinner, 24 Hours Notice,” Vogue, July 1, 1961, http://search.proquest.com/
vogue/docview/879279862/fulltext/5950E03A6CAF4CABPQ/4?accountid=15172.
6

7
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8
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in their CREST system. I opened boxes kept in the sub-basement of my grandfather’s old summer home in Maine. I have a duffel bag full of family photographs under my desk, in my bedroom, and I’ve organized more files than I can read.
Initially, I was running on the adrenaline that comes with suspicion. I wanted to delineate
his entire relationship with the CIA from the moment he left official employment until the moment, in the mid-70s, when he became the subject of Washington rumors hatched in the incubator of broader CIA-media scandals (the ancestors of the questions posed by the forums I found).
In some ways, I’ve constructed a narrative; I understand that narrative as a tentative thread in a
pattern of doubt. I’ve stitched and un-stitched; changed my mind; tried to keep myself from embroidering, or adding embellishment. In many ways, my knowledge is limited by the pre-editing
of materials. I have the files my grandfather kept, obsessively; I don’t have anything he threw
out. I don’t have the names cut out from some of the papers I found; I don’t have the CIA files
cut off in the CREST system. I filed Freedom of Information Act requests with the FBI and the
CIA fourteen months ago; as of yet, I don’t have those, either. I have what people will tell me.
This essay tries to place my grandfather, and his work, in the context of his time. A lot
changed in America between the early fifties and the mid-seventies. Patriotism, and patriotic
journalism, meant different things between the time he began his career and the time his integrity
came under question. He worked for the CIA, and began his career in journalism, as part of a
generation of fresh World War Two victors envisioning themselves in the midst of their next war
—the Cold War—in which the intentions, and practices, of the American government were largely trusted by a relatively unquestioning American population. Patriotism, then, seems less complicated. But I grew up on the other end of Vietnam and Watergate, Snowden and September 11th
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and Wikileaks. I’ve been taught, implicitly and explicitly, not to trust my government: a clouded
body I understand as a potentially adversarial Other who, I’m told, lies to me. That’s the mood
from which I began my research. In some ways, my grandfather's work helped produce that
change, as his writing argued against a war that sent early shocks—what he called "national convulsions”—through the American identity. This paper positions him within that shift, at a moment of national tension and scrutiny, in which he—an old boy—had to prove that he was not
under the thumb of a government that dressed like he did.
In 1974, a Chicago newspaperman accused my grandfather and his writing of CIA taint.
His work and his methods suddenly became a public moral question that he had to answer. For
the past year, I’ve been trying to understand how he did that—to himself, to his readers, to his
family—and to see where he and I agree. I’m named for the town he grew up in; I go to the
school he graduated from; I’m writing as his granddaughter. I’m trying to understand, and to empathize.
***
In 1974, journalist Seymour Hersh began publishing a series of articles in the New York
Times that would lead to a national reckoning with the CIA’s practices in the twenty-seven years
since its charter. The articles were quietly kicked off by a small piece that ran on December
tenth, on page fifteen, next to an almost full-page ad for Saks Fifth Avenue. The drama of the article, “Senators Suggest Checks on Spying,” is overshadowed by the illustration of two welldressed women about as tall, and three times as wide, as the article itself. Her armpit and elbow
jut into the news: four witnesses had testified to a Senate Committee saying that Congress needed to expand its oversight of U.S. intelligence operations, both international and domestic. The
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article quotes Senator Edmund S. Muskie, of Maine: “in recent years we have seen alarming evidence that we may have created a monster.” 9
In a following series published on the front page close to every day from the end of December through the beginning of January, Hersh exposed the American public to the CIA’s previously un-publicized domestic surveillance tactics. Potentially-questionable CIA practices had
been written about before—Hersh, for example, had written just a few months prior about the
agency’s work to overthrow Chile’s Marxist president, Salvador Allende, in an article that ran
next to another coat ad—but previous coverage had either focused on the agency’s action, or alleged action, abroad, or didn’t ignite significant attention. The December 1974 series produced
national outcry with its accusation that the CIA was spying at home.10, 11
The first article ran on December 22 with the headline, in all italicized capitals, “HUGE
C.I.A. OPERATION REPORTED IN U.S. AGAINST ANTIWAR FORCES, OTHER DISSIDENTS IN NIXON YEARS.” Below it ran a subheading, “Files On Citizens,” and head shots
(looking almost like mug shots) of the three most recent Directors of Central Intelligence:
Richard Helms, James R. Schlesinger, and William E. Colby, who was the acting director at the
time of the article’s publication. Citing “well-placed government sources,” the article was located
Seymour Hersh, “Senators Suggest Checks on Spying,” New York Times (New York, NY), Dec.
10, 1974, http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1974/12/10/99196512.html?pageNumber=15.
9

10

Seymour Hersh, “C.I.A. Said to Have Asked Funds for Chile Rightists in ’73: A Reactionary
Group,” New York Times (New York, NY), Oct. 21, 1974, http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/
timesmachine/1974/10/21/issue.html.
Loch K. Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies: The Experience
and Legacy of the Church Committee,” Public Administration Review 64, no. 1 (2004): 5-8.
University of Georgia.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2004.00342.x/epdf.
11
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in the top-right corner of the front page, and it claimed that “The Central Intelligence Agency,
directly violating its charter, conducted a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during
the Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United
States.” The agency had compiled more than 10,000 intelligence files on Americans through a
unit under Richard Helms, whose term as Director of Central Intelligence lasted from 1966
through 1973; and further, evidence suggested that the unit had been conducting break-ins, wiretappings, and the “surreptitious inspection of mail” since the nineteen-fifties.12 According to the
terms by which the CIA had emerged from the aftermath of the second World War, in its sixparagraph outline within Truman's National Security Act of 1947, the agency was prohibited
from acting with any “police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions”
over Americans in their home country.13 , 14 James Angleton, a CIA employee of thirty-one years
whom the Times accused of directing the unit, announced his resignation the afternoon the article
was published.15

12

Seymour Hersh, “Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,” New York Times (New York, NY), Dec. 22, 1974, http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1974/12/22/issue.html.
“The National Security Act of 1947,” Public Law 253, 80th Congress, Chapter 343, 1st Session, S. 758, July 26, 1947, http://global.oup.com/us/companion.websites/9780195385168/resources/chapter10/nsa/nsa.pdf.
13

14

Gary Hart, “Chapter Two: Liberty and Security,” in U.S. National Security, Intelligence, and
Democracy: From the Church Committee to the War on Terror, ed. Russell A. Miller (New York:
Routledge, 2008), 20.
Seymour Hersh, “Underground for the C.I.A. in New York: An Ex-Agent Tells of Spying on
Students,” New York Times (New York, NY), Dec. 29, 1974, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9506E0DC1E3BE53ABC4151DFB467838F669EDE.
15
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Hersh’s articles were a capstone to a few years in which Americans were primed for further evidence that their trust in the U.S. government was misplaced, if not misguided. In 1974 the
last American troops had just been withdrawn from Vietnam, where they had participated in a
war remembered for both its international failure and the corresponding domestic turmoil as the
public tuned in to media portrayal of government-sponsored carnage.16, 17 The publication of the
Pentagon Papers, revealing the military’s attempt to conceal the bombing of Cambodia, the My
Lai massacre, and other secret horrors, had only contributed to the erosion of public faith in the
motivation and mechanics of the American government. 18 President Nixon had just resigned in
August 1974, amid national outrage over the Watergate break-in and the ensuing cover-up, coverage of which added domestic depth to broad-sweeping cynicism about American politicians
and the system within which they operated.19
Hersh’s series continued into January with increasing conviction, as the story developed
to include government officials and members, or former members, of the intelligence community
corroborating some of the allegations printed in the Times. Hersh reported CIA spying on student
groups, particularly antiwar protestors at Columbia University, as well as repeated infiltration of
“various ethnic and émigré groups in large cities.”20 The presiding director of the CIA, William
Colby, confirmed in a report to President Ford that the CIA had been collecting files on over
Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies: The Experience and
Legacy of the Church Committee,” 5.
16

17

Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2001), 6-7.

Howard Bray, The Pillars of the Post: The Making of a News Empire in Washington (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1980), 113-114.
18

19

Schulman, 47-48.

20

Hersh, “Underground for the C.I.A. in New York: An Ex-Agent Tells of Spying on Students.”
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9,000 American citizens.21 And E. Howard Hunt, a Watergate burglar who had already been released, was quoted as having testified that projects under the Domestic Operations Division had
conducted the “subsidizing and manipulation” of certain American media organizations in the
early sixties, and that the agency’s “questionable” (in Hersh’s terms) operations had been conducted since the Kennedy administration, earlier than initially alleged.22 Congress was swamped
with thousands of letters from Americans worried that Watergate might jhave just foreshadowed
new revelations of government misdoing at home.23
In the next weeks, three governmental committees were established to investigate Hersh’s
allegations: a presidential inquiry commission placed under Vice President Rockefeller, a Senatebased investigative committee (created after a near-unanimous affirmative vote) directed by Senator Frank Church, and a House committee, ultimately headed by Otis Pike.24, 25, 26 In total, the
Rockefeller investigation lasted for half a year, the Pike review for nearly a full year, and the
21

Seymour Hersh, “Colby Said to Confirm C.I.A. Role in U.S.,” New York Times (New York,
NY), Jan. 1, 1974, http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1975/01/01/109378183.html?
pageNumber=1.
Seymour Hersh, “Hunt Tells of Early Work For a C.I.A. Domestic Unit,” New York Times
(New York, NY), Dec. 31, 1974, http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/
1974/12/31/99197178.html?pageNumber=1.
22

23

Johnson, “ Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies,” 4-6.

Seymour Hersh, “Ford Names Rockefeller to Head Inquiry into C.I.A.; Wants Report in 90
Days,” New York Times (New York, NY), Jan. 6, 1975, http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1975/01/06/82168945.html?pageNumber=1/.
24

25

David E. Rosenbaum, “C.I.A.-F.B.I. Inquiry Voted by Senate,” New York Times (New York,
NY), Jan. 27, 1975, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9404E5DD133AE03BBC4051DFB766838E669EDE.
Gerald K. Haines, “The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA,” Central Intelligence
Agency Library, accessed February 1, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-ofintelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art07.html.
26
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Church Committee (formally titled the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities) continued its examination for the next
sixteen months. Ultimately, the Committee conducted over 126 meetings, 800 interviews, and
more than 200 hearings, and compiled over 110,000 pages of documentation.27 , 28 There has never, before or since, been such a broad, comprehensive review of American intelligence agencies.
Within two years of its completion, the committee evolved into a permanent body—the Senate
Intelligence Committee—which had just released its December 2014 report on the CIA's “enhanced interrogation techniques” at the time I began researching the committee’s creation.29, 30
As the American public learned from reports the committees published over 1975 and
1976, the government’s intelligence agencies had been habitually infiltrating domestic religious,
academic, and activist organizations including the NAACP, the Socialist Workers Party, women’s
groups aligned with the Women’s Liberation Movement, and universities where leftist culture
had gained a foothold. Wiretaps, bugs, mail openings, and break-ins had been performed on
thousands of civilians. The FBI’s COINTELPRO program had identified Martin Luther King, Jr.,
as a threat and had attempted to incite his suicide; the CIA had experimented with LSD on “un-

27

LeRoy Ashby, “Chapter Five: The Church Committee’s history and relevance: Reflecting on
Senator Church,” in U.S. National Security, Intelligence, and Democracy: From the Church
Committee to the War on Terror, ed. Russell A. Miller (New York: Routledge, 2008), 63.
Loch K. Johnson, “Chapter Four: Establishment of modern intelligence accountability,” in
U.S. National Security, Intelligence, and Democracy: From the Church Committee to the War on
Terror, ed. Russell A. Miller (New York: Routledge, 2008), 39.
28

29

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, “Chapter Three: The Church Committee, then and now,” in U.S. National Security, Intelligence, and Democracy: From the Church Committee to the War on Terror,
ed. Russell A. Miller (New York: Routledge, 2008), 22.
30

Schwarz, 34-36.
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witting subjects” in an attempt to test the drug’s efficacy as a potential weapon against Soviets.31
There had been CIA attempts to assassinate at least six national leaders worldwide, including Fidel Castro; repeated attempts to overthrow foreign governments; the successful toppling of
Chile's democratically-elected president. The CIA’s PHOENIX program had conducted systematic assassinations of thousands of Vietnamese civilians accused of cooperating with the
Vietcong.32, 33
As the Times stories and reports claimed, the intelligence programs had been designed
and implemented by governments consumed with Cold War paranoia and bravado. Goals of defeating Soviet power and containing Communist influence seemed to justify, to those in command, tactics that came to scandalize an audience of American civilians predisposed for further
disenchantment with their government.34 Loch K. Johnson, who served as special assistant to
Senator Church, later deemed 1975 “the year of intelligence”—the year when the revelations
brought forth by the Church, Pike, and Rockefeller committees “did nothing less than revolutionize America’s attitudes towards intelligence supervision.” 35
Along the turmoil over all the revelations involving intelligence-gathering on American
civilians, covert efforts towards assassinations, and attempted governmental overthrows, the in-

Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., “The Church Committee and a new era of intelligence
oversight,” Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 2 (2007), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
full/10.1080/02684520701303881.
31

32

Hart, “Liberty and security,” 15-16.

33 Ashby,

“Chapter Five: The Church Committee’s history and relevance: Reflecting on Senator
Church,” 58-59.
34 Ashby,
35

58-59.

Johnson, “Establishment of modern intelligence accountability,” 38.
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vestigations reported another form of intelligence overstep: the infiltration of the American media by members of the CIA.36 As found by the Church Committee, American journalists had, for
decades, been collecting intelligence for the agency. They had also “devised and placed” propaganda, particularly in international media outlets (though that planted information could, and
sometimes would, filter back to American sources).37
According to the reports, over twelve American news organizations and commercial publishing houses had “provided cover” to agents abroad. Some of the organizations were unaware
that their publications were providing agents cover, while some executives had facilitated the
agents’ placement. Some of the journalists were salaried by the agency; some volunteered their
time, or their page space, through “unpaid, occasional, covert contact.” The Church report
claimed the CIA had maintained “covert relationships with about 50 American journalists or employees of U.S. media organizations” up until February 1976, when (partially due to pressure
resulting from the various committee investigations) the agency announced a new policy claiming it would not “enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time
news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service.” 38 Fewer than half of the fifty journal-

36

Johnson, “Establishment of modern intelligence accountability,” 39.

37

“The Domestic Impact of Foreign Clandestine Operations: The CIA and Academic Institutions, the Media, and Religious Institutions,” in Book I, “Foreign and Military Intelligence,” of
the Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, April 26, 1976, 179, http://aarclibrary.org/publib/
church/reports/book1/html/ChurchB1_0094a.htm.
“The Domestic Impact of Foreign Clandestine Operations: The CIA and Academic Institutions, the Media, and Religious Institutions,” 192.
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ists already employed by the CIA, or involved in another form of covert relationship, would be
“terminated” under the new guidelines.39
But the report’s information is sketchy and often vague. While the Committee claimed it
was granted “full and unfettered access” to CIA documents and files relating to all of its
pre-1967 activity, that access came with a “single exception: records on media relationships.”
Names of individual agents were not provided to the Committee.40 Much of the pertinent language is italicized in the final report, denoting that the material had been “substantially abridge
(sic) at the request of the executive agencies.” Following the claim that the CIA maintained
covert relations with 50 American media members, the report italicized (or abridged) their context: “They are part of a network of several hundred foreign individuals who provide intelligence
for the CIA and at times attempt to influence foreign opinion through the use of covert propaganda. These individuals provide the CIA with direct access to a large number of foreign newspapers and periodicals, scores of press services and news agencies, radio and television stations,
commercial books publishers, and other foreign media outlets.” 41 Of the American media members, former director William Colby described four general types of relationships to the Committee. The first three involved staff of general circulation U.S. news organizations, staff of smaller
U.S. publications, or free-lancers, stringers, “propaganda writers,” and employees of American
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publishing houses, all working under “cover” and paid by the CIA. The last category included
“journalists with whom CIA maintains unpaid, occasional, covert contact.” 42
According to Book I of the Church report (as well much of the later scholarship that contextualizes it), this type of “clandestine cooperation” originated within the context of the early
Cold War, when “most Americans perceived a real threat of a communist imperium and were
prepared to assist their government to counter that threat.” As the communists attempted to influence international opinions through control over international organizations, the United States
tried to do the same, “involving American private institutions and individuals in the secret struggle over minds, institutions and ideas.” But the American public’s perception of legitimate communist threat had declined since the early fifties, meaning that any clandestine operations continued since then gave, in the words of the report, “increasing currency to doubts as to whether it
made sense for a democracy to resort to practices such as the clandestine use of free American
institutions and individuals.”43 In other words, when read in the political climate of the mid-seventies, “covert relationships” between the CIA and the American media were more likely to be
read as duplicitous conspiracy, rather than respectable cooperation. And in the early December
2014 morning when I first read the report, tucked into a chair next to a still-dark window, I, too,
was inclined towards suspicion.
This is what I knew: my grandfather had spent a year in the CIA before returning to the
Wall Street Journal, where he covered American politics out of Washington before moving over-
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seas by 1956 to write in and about the countries the U.S. government was dispensing propaganda
to, or about. He was the Journal’s Chief European Correspondent, first in Paris, then in London,
and his beat included included much of Europe, especially Berlin, as well as a particular focus on
the Middle East, including Egypt, the Suez, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. He stayed abroad until
1960, when he came back to Washington and was the Journal’s Chief Diplomatic Correspondent,
mainly writing on Latin America, Europe, and Southeast Asia, and occasionally traveling on assignment. , , 444546 He had a lot of friends in the CIA, even if he wasn’t officially employed. A
government document cryptically presented four types of relationships he could have had to the
CIA, while italicizing or omitting the details, in passages whose language wasn’t so dissimilar
from the online theories I was both obsessively filing and instinctually disbelieving. But I trusted
the reports more than I trusted whokilledjfk.net.
I’d known my grandfather had written a book. Lyndon B. Johnson and the World focuses
on President Johnson’s foreign policy, and was published in 1966, the year before the CIA limited its publishing program. By that point, it turned out, the program had already subsidized the
publication of “well over a thousand books,” over a quarter of them in English. In a subsection
on book publishing—“Two Issues: ‘Fallout and the Integrity of a Free Press’”—the Church report included one of the only proper names of the heavily edited chapter. E. Howard Hunt, the
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man in charge of CIA relationships with American publishers in the late 1960s (and later one of
the men convicted in the Watergate burglary) testified to the Committee that while most of the
CIA books were written with foreign audiences in mind, and distributed outside of the United
States, some of the books had been domestically circulated, and not necessarily accidentally. The
Committee excerpted his testimony.
Question. Did you take some sort of steps to make sure that things that were published in English were kept out of or away from the American reading public?
Mr. HUNT. It was impossible because Praeger was a commercial U.S. publisher.
His books had to be seen, had to be bought here, had to be read… the ultimate
target was foreign, which was true, but how much of the Praeger output actually
got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable.47
Praeger published my grandfather’s book.
That doesn’t prove CIA sponsorship, or subsidization, or support, just as his presence in
Europe in the mid-fifties doesn’t prove his covert Cold War cooperation with the American intelligence agencies who could have found him useful. But I was shocked to find what felt like reputable needles of doubt, poking holes in my image of a grandfather whose journalism expressly
defied the government he had, it turned out, expressly been tied to—possibly for longer than
publicly acknowledged.
***
The Church and Pike reports didn't contain the first mentions of CIA infiltration of the
American media, but their depth, weight, and extensive popular attention added gravity to previous coverage and claims that had gone relatively unnoticed prior to the Year of Intelligence. Stuart Loory, then a New York Times journalist who went on to edit the Chicago Sun-Times, had al“The Domestic Impact of Foreign Clandestine Operations: The CIA and Academic Institutions, the Media, and Religious Institutions,” 199.
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ready published an article in the Columbia Journalism Review titled “The CIA’s use of the press:
a ‘mighty Wurlitzer’” on September 1, 1974, a few months before Seymour Hersh began publishing his Times series. The article examined what Loory found to be an odd phenomenon: by
that point, there had been a handful of public disclosures of media ties to the CIA, and no one—
neither the public, nor the mainstream media community—had bit. “Journalists themselves are
involved,” reads the subheading, “and that may explain media neglect of the story.”48
Above the text sat an image of a clip of a Washington Star-News front-page story from
November 30, 1973, by Oswald Johnston. It’s titled “Journalists doubling as CIA Contacts,” and
claimed that as of the time of the article’s publication, the CIA payroll included 36 American
journalists employed as undercover informants or full-time agents; and that 40 full-time reporters, free-lancers, and correspondents were listed by the CIA as regular undercover contacts
who were routinely paid for their information. The revelations came about as a result of a review
that new Director of Central Intelligence William Colby had ordered in 1973, in response to
queries from the Times and Washington Star-News as to whether any of their own staff were being paid by the CIA. The queries had followed a short-lived media flurry over allegations that
Seymour K. Freiden, a popular foreign correspondent for the Hearst newspapers, had worked for
the CIA. “The use of foreign correspondents by the CIA has been quietly suspected—and feared
—for years by legitimate reporters who have worked overseas,” wrote Johnston, in 1973. “But
the suspicion has never been verifiable until now.” Johnston claimed that following the review, a
surprised Colby “ordered a significant cutback” in CIA ties to journalists affiliated with major
Stuart H. Loory, “The CIA’s use of the press: a ‘mighty Wurlitzer,’” Columbia Journalism Review 13, no. 3 (New York, NY), Sept. 1, 1974, 9, http://search.proquest.com/docview/
1298102602?pq-origsite=gscholar.
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media outlets. Underneath the image of Johnston's text, Loory wrote the caption, “The story that
was not pursued.” 49
Loory claimed that the news that journalists themselves were on the CIA payroll, as reported by Johnston and a few others, “caused a brief stir, and then was dropped.” The New York
Times, he said, had reprinted Johnston’s story on its front page on December 1; otherwise, it was
ignored, besides that the Post “rewrote it, added some congressional reaction, and ran the story
inside the paper.” But the Post also printed an earlier version of Loory’s Review article, as a short
piece under Loory’s byline on the Post’s editorial page on January 13, 1974, eight months before
the fuller-bodied exposition appeared in the Review. By that point, Geyelin had been working at
the Post for nearly a decade, and had been running the paper’s editorial page for the past six
years. Printing Loory’s early article was Geyelin’s choice to make.
Titled “Press Credibility and Journalist-Spies,” Loory's January op-ed asserted that in
“the old days—the pre-Watergate days—when even small deceptions by the government, once
revealed were considered scandalous, the revelation that the Central Intelligence Agency was
using American foreign correspondents as spies would have provoked an uproar.” Loory goes on
to claim that the lackluster public response to the disclosures made a few weeks prior by DCI
William Colby—that the CIA had 36 agents working abroad as foreign correspondents, or using
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their positions for cover—was insufficient against the threat of a compromised press corps.50 The
printing of the story on Geyelin’s page, even if it is only in the middle of the paper, provides a
counterpoint to the decision-making Loory went on to criticize in the Review piece: it represents
a choice, at least, not to suppress a story. The choice ultimately proved ironic, because it was
Loory’s Review article the following fall that led fingers to point at Geyelin as one of the “journalist-spies” the article describes. Geyelin’s decision to print the early version of an article that
implicated him could speak to a certain shrewdness—his own printing of the story could serve as
a helpful safeguard against future accusations, should his own conduct ever come under scrutiny.
But it also could have come from a blind innocence as to the turns the next year would take: he
might not have ever considered that Loory would soon accuse him of being a "journalist-spy"
himself.51
Loory claimed the practice of using journalists was initiated, or invented, by Frank Wisner, the head of the CIA’s Office of Policy Coordination and later the CIA’s Deputy Director of
Plans. At the agency in the early fifties, he created what Loory calls a “wondrous machine,” what
Wisner named his “mighty Wurlitzer”: a department that used a collection of instruments—labor
unions, charities, publishing houses, student groups, media outlets—to play pro-America, anti-
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communist tune. Most often it invested in, or infiltrated, media and projects dispelled overseas—
but not exclusively, and either way, propaganda fallout could easily reach American ears. While
Loory asserted that many of the participating newsmen were foreign journalists, he claimed that
the CIA also approached American correspondents, asking them to collect or plant information
and sometimes paying them to do so. Some journalists rejected the propositions. But, reported
Loory,
John A. Bross, a former deputy to the director of the CIA, says he knows of one
American newsman who did not refuse the agency overtures. This newsman,
while a young correspondent working in Western Europe, joined the CIA as a fullfledged clandestine agent. He was not merely an informant who received a small
retainer, expenses or occasional fees for his services. He was as much at the beck
and call of the CIA as his overt employer. His identity was such a deeply held secret that Bross had served for two years as director of a division carrying out
clandestine operations in Eastern Europe before he learned the identity of the
newsman-agent.
The newsman’s assignment was to keep tabs on Eastern European Communists traveling in Western Europe. “He’s in a very responsible position right
now,” Bross says. Further than that Bross will not go. 52
My grandfather kept a clip of this page in his files. These two paragraphs are underlined
and bracketed in red. “John A. Bross” is circled in black, and “Eastern European Communists
traveling” is underlined in black, too. Geyelin kept it because John A. Bross was talking about
him.53
Sy Hersh published his series in the Times a few months after Loory’s article went to
print. The Church, Pike, and Rockefeller committees followed. Unlike the Church report, the full
Pike report was never officially published, facing Congressional pressure to keep it under wraps
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(and, reported the Village Voice, especially strong pressure from Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, who opposed the report’s publication). But information was leaked. The Village Voice
published a leaked draft in its February 16, 1976 issue, in 24-page special supplement titled “The
CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read.”54 Rumors, or details, got out.
During its investigation the committee had compiled a list of “suspected newsmenspooks,” as Howard Bray called them in his 1980 Washington Post retrospective, The Pillars of
the Post. They came up with about fifty names, one of them supplied by John A. Bross, who had
run CIA clandestine operations in Eastern Europe and remembered a correspondent who had secretly “kept tabs for the CIA on Iron Curtain travelers in Western Europe.”55 His name was Phil
Geyelin; and while Bross had refrained from giving Loory his name at the time he was researching his article, he didn’t withhold the information from the Pike researcher who asked him about
it. The name got out to Washington. Some suspected that ties to the agency were keeping
Geyelin's editorial page “soft” on the CIA; or that, in a related sense, they explained the editorial
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page’s recent criticism of the way the Pike committee was handling its investigations.56, 57, 58
Others were just suspicious.
On April 13, 1976, Geyelin called Bross to address the rumors that had, by then, gained
momentum in Washington. The next day, Bross wrote to Richard Helms, the Director of Central
Intelligence from 1966 until 1973. Helms had served as chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff
from 1951 until 1953, and then was promoted to Chief of Operations, a position he held for seven years. He was in charge of both intelligence collection and covert operations and the deputy to
his friend, Frank Wisner, creator of the "Wurlitzer," who had killed himself in 1965. 59, 60 Bross

This was despite a Charles Seib editorial on the Post’s January 30, 1976, that references the
1973 admissions by Colby and the relatively subdued media and public response to the story
(naming Loory’s Columbia Journalism Review piece as the notable exception). Seib’s piece, on
Geyelin’s page, calls for journalists to be better this time around, even though congressional
sources seemed to be “exceptionally tight-lipped” about leaks. “Nevertheless,” he wrote, “the
press should not again let this matter sink from view until it resurfaces, a few months or years
from now, with new figures but with the same basic fact: pollution of the news business by the
spy business. The identities of the journalists should be made known, and soon. If publication
could endanger some in foreign posts, the agency should be given time—a brief time—to get
them out.” It seems unlikely that an editor concerned about a legitimately duplicitous relationship reaching public attention would want to publish another editorial on his editorial page calling for all press-C.I.A. ties to be publicly revealed; that said, as with the printing of Loory’s January 1974 article, I can’t speak to Geyelin’s motivations, or strategy, or innocence. (Charles B.
Seib, “News Business, Spy Business,” Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), January 30, 1976,
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sent him a copy of the letter, which Geyelin kept, and which I found this summer in the Library
of Congress in the first of the 127 boxes they’d kept of his files.
Addressed to “Dick,” it opened with a call Bross had gotten from Loory shortly after
Bross had left “the Agency.” Loory had wanted to know about CIA relations with the press, generally, and had claimed to have evidence demonstrating a common CIA practice: using journalistic cover for their spies. But Bross told him that in his “entire career on the operational side of
the Agency,” he only remembered one brief instance where a journalist was used. It was in the
early 1950s, and the journalist was Phil Geyelin.
He knew, he said, that Geyelin had worked for Frank Wisner’s Office of Policy Coordination “in its earliest and wildest days.” But he also, he said, “was under the distinct impression
that he had served the Agency during the course of his work for the Wall Street Journal in Europe
by providing some coverage of Soviet or other subversive activities in Germany as it came to his
attention.” Bross thought Helms had told him this in a conversation in the early fifties. But either
way, he said, it seemed clear that Geyelin’s “service” had been very brief, if it existed at all. By
the time he gave Geyelin’s name to the Pike Committee investigator in the summer of 1975, he
wrote, Geyelin’s association with the agency was already “common gossip” anyway. Still, he
wrote Helms, it was clear the leak was causing Geyelin “a lot of trouble.” There wasn’t any ambivalence over whether Geyelin had worked for the CIA; but Geyelin had called him, the day
before, to root out the rumors he said were threatening his career.
Bross had told Geyelin on the phone, and Helms in the letter, that it was very possible
that his memory was hazy, or wrong. He was happy to try and clear up what happened, given that
it mattered to Geyelin. But, he wrote, he was “perplexed” about the current attitudes regarding
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the press and the government. Geyelin, he wrote, seemed to feel that a journalist who chose to
serve the CIA for espionage purposes would somehow be “morally contaminated.” If the allegation was untrue, he wrote, Geyelin was “certainly entitled to have his word substantiated”—but
the motivation, or the concept, was something Bross failed to understand. “As I told Phil,” he
wrote to Helms,
it has seemed wholly admirable, under certain circumstances, for journalists in
general and him in particular to have served our government’s intelligence requirements—particularly in the early 50’s when many of us in Germany could
practically hear Soviet tank treads churning around Berlin.
Fifty years ago it was considered fitting and proper for American journalists to report indications of potentially hostile foreign activity which came to their
attention while serving abroad—in other words to serve intelligence purposes….
Given what was generally known about Soviet policy and practice in the post
World War II period the distinction between war and peace seems to me to have
no validity at all.
There is a basic paradox in all this. It is apparently all right for journalists
to make their readers the beneficiaries of what is after all espionage carried out
against the U.S. Government, but not all right to make the U.S. Government the
beneficiary of coverage which they carry out against foreign countries. In both
cases the role appropriate for a presumptively beneficient (sic), elected, representative government is very peculiar. 61
Bross’s response points to a confusion, or distaste, echoed by Helms in his response and
other members of an earlier American generation. “What I totally fail to understand,” he ended,
is the implication that journalists who choose to serve in this capacity are somehow morally contaminated. Phil Geylin (sic) seems to feel that this is the way it
is, however. In any event if he never did work for the Agency, as he says, he is
certainly entitled to have his word substantiated.
In his mind, journalists posted abroad were just Americans, posted abroad, in the early days of
the Cold War. They were all, supposedly, on the same side. Bross implies that the journalistic
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feats of the recent years—years of Vietnam, the Pentagon Papers, Watergate—had been products
of “espionage carried out against the U.S. government.” Why, he asked, would that be less
morally contaminated than espionage carried out against foreign countries—which, in the context of the Cold War, would benefit the American government, rather than bring it to its knees? In
both cases—in which journalists spied on their country, or denied their country information—the
American government appeared the adversary. To Bross, this was “peculiar.” But by the midseventies, that adversarial relationship didn’t seem so peculiar for those for whom Geyelin’s alleged relationship with the CIA was disconcerting. Given that those people were Geyelin’s readership, their opinions mattered. Whatever Geyelin had or hadn’t done, and had or hadn’t thought
about it, his professional standing hinged on his readers', and peers', belief in his integrity. In the
face of rumors, he was vulnerable to their imagination.
Helms wrote back to Bross a week later, from Tehran, where he was then posted as the
American ambassador. He claimed he had no “independent recollection” of Geyelin’s association
with the Agency—which wasn’t to say that he might not have known something in the early
fifties, but that he at least didn’t remember anything anymore. As best as he could recollect, he
said, he hadn’t heard until quite recently that Geyelin had, at one time, been identified with OPC.
Regarding arrangements with the Wall Street Journal, he wrote, “My mind is a blank.” Frankly,
he thought, he didn’t remember meeting Geyelin until the sixties, when he met him as he met
many other newspapermen working in D.C. But either way, as to why it mattered, Helms said he
shared Bross’s “perplexity” at Geyelin’s attitude. He chalked it up to time, implying that
Geyelin’s present perceptions were tinting his hindsight. It seemed, wrote Helms, that Geyelin
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was trapped in the recent scandals, press attention, and Congressional hearings that had recently
been causing the “Intelligence Community” so much trouble. “After all,” he wrote,
we have been living during this past year with a sea change in the public’s view of
what a secret service should be permitted to do. The national attitude in 1966 was
obviously significantly different from that of 1975. Since man was not blessed
with a capacity for clairvoyance, it is exceedingly difficult to anticipate at one
state in one’s career how people might view actions many years later against a
different background and in another context.62
The implication—whether or not it was true—is that Geyelin was panicking over previously understandable actions whose motivations were no longer legible against the backdrop of
1976. Helms claimed he couldn’t remember what Geyelin had, or hadn’t, done. But the tone of
the letter points to a broader point: that even if Geyelin had committed acts he now denied, the
denial was coming out of nothing more than a need to stay afloat in changing national waters. To
the moral questions, Helms assigned no gravity.
Bross wrote to Phil on April 28th, attaching copies of the letters to and from Helms. He
apologized for his memory, which he said was “undoubtedly to blame” for the embarrassment of
the rumors. He might have, he wrote, simply remembered some kind of report from one of “our
people” in Germany, or somewhere else in Europe, that passed on some information attributed to
Geyelin. He’d assumed at the time, and since, that Geyelin had been working for the Agency; but
that, he said, appeared to have been a mistake. “Our people abroad, or many of them, learned a
lot from journalists and reported what they learned,” he wrote. “This is very likely what hap-
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pened to you.” He was prepared, he said, to do anything he could to clear up any
misconceptions.63
But by then, Geyelin was already doing what he could on his own: making plans to go to
the CIA himself, and find out whatever it was they had kept on him. He brought his friend Joseph
Califano, then the Post’s attorney, who had just helped another Post reporter carry out a similar
investigation after facing similar rumors.64 “It was a time when everyone was looking for anything they could get on anybody in that connection in Washington,” Califano told me over the
phone. Geyelin was concerned, said Califano, that the allegations would have a serious impact
on Geyelin’s professional standing.65 Over the next two months, the men went on a series of visits to CIA headquarters with a twofold mission: they wanted to see what was in any files the
agency had kept, and they wanted a letter from George H. W. Bush, then the Director of Central
Intelligence, delineating what, exactly, the relationship had been. Preferably (or exclusively), it
would be written in terms that excused Geyelin of any perceived misconduct. The best record I
have of what they found comes from memos Califano wrote, and kept, following the meetings,
which Geyelin kept next to the copies of the correspondence now housed at the Library.
Califano’s first memo is dated April 29, 1976. It says that he and Geyelin met with
Richard Lansdale, then the acting general counsel of the CIA, who read to the men from what he
called “Mr. Geyelin’s 201 file.” He wouldn’t let them read it themselves. The file was created in
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November of 1957, and began with the personal history that Geyelin included in his job application from August 21, 1950. The agency couldn’t find, said Lansdale, the personnel action paper
that would show when Geyelin was first employed, and when he left employment; but other papers, he told them, indicated that the period of employment had lasted from December 1950 to
December 1951, the timeframe Geyelin had described. After that, all that I know comes from the
notes in Califano’s memo, written from what Lansdale ostensibly read to them.
Much of the memo seems to include CIA talk about what Geyelin could potentially do for
the agency while he was stationed abroad. There are a lot of requests for clearances, starting in
1954, when (in Califano’s words) “there was a request from one of the European Operating Divisions to obtain appropriate clearances for Geyelin in order to ‘use as a cover contact [?] in the
developmental program in the international business field.’” The bracketed question mark is Califano’s own. The next sentence seems to try and clear it up—“Lansdale said that this was what
the Agency did as a prelude to determining whether or not to try and use someone in civilian
life”—but it doesn’t really explain how the Agency meant to “use” him. The clearance was approved, though, and Geyelin was told (here, Califano quotes the CIA) he was “not to represent
himself nor is he to be represented as an employee of the CIA.”
The next year, the American Division approved Geyelin’s use in an “operational capacity” in Paris on “labor projects,” with talk of using him in Rome and Frankfurt on similar projects
as well. In later years, he was given the telephone number and home address of the agency’s station chief in Paris; he was given clearance (or the CIA was granted clearance to “use” him) a
number of other times; he was again admonished not to represent himself as a CIA employee.
One cable asked for “continued clearance” of Geyelin, “including his potential use to obtain po-
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litical information.” In March 1959, Washington told the London Station Chief that “operational
approval for use of Geyelin in Paris” was still good in London. He was described as “well
known” to the London station chief, who requested approval to use him as an occasional informant; and after a lunch with the Paris station chief, he was noted as potentially a “very reliable
and discreet contact,” who respected the work the Agency was doing in Paris.
Many of the instances, which Califano separated into bullet-like paragraphs, make mention of where Geyelin would be traveling, primarily or ostensibly for his work as a journalist—“a
brief assignment to the Middle East,” Germany, Warsaw. An October 1957 cable from Paris to
Washington told headquarters that Geyelin was going to Poland for four to six weeks, and “wondered what Geyelin could do for them in Poland.” “According to Lansdale,” wrote Califano,
“there were apparently exchanges of correspondence and/or cables between Europe and the U.S.
about when Mr. Geyelin would be contacted.” I don’t have that correspondence, though, or those
cables. I just have whatever Geyelin kept of what Califano noted of what Lansdale said.
The memos, though, seem to have been kept in their entirety. And many of the notes
seem to point to the sort of relationship my grandfather would later defend. A 1956 memorandum
containing (in a quote of Lansdale) “ruminations on possible operational use” indicated, in Califano’s terms, “that Geyelin agreed to help in France consistent with his obligations as a reporter.”
Another from 1956 claimed that an “entirely spontaneous” contact between Geyelin and the
Paris station chief indicated that “Geyelin seemed willing to cooperate ‘provided the task given
him would not interfere with his responsibilities and loyalty to the Wall Street Journal.’” An earlier memo, from 1955, similarly noted that “arrangements were made” for a meeting with
Geyelin, where he “indicated he was willing to provide information to the CIA ‘without interfer-
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ing with or embarrassing the Journal.’” The “agent” who met with him, it said, “indicated that
Geyelin was ‘definitely interested and willing.’” In all of those quotes, the internal quotations,
written by Califano, seem to note a quote from Lansdale, or from the file, which maybe quoted
an agent, or a younger Geyelin. And a memo noting an instance in 1958, in New York, when an
agency member contacted Geyelin for a briefing on Paris, Bonn, and London, contained a bracketed note from Califano with Geyelin’s 1976 explanation: that “this apparently was when he was
on home leave from the Wall Street Journal and that the Wall Street Journal had a practice of
permitting the CIA to debrief and interview foreign correspondents.” The memo that noted
Geyelin’s respect for the type of work the Agency was doing in France also noted that the station
chief, who made the note, would give him a full briefing on what they were doing.
That last type of interaction—in which Geyelin was the one receiving the information—
points to the sort of reciprocal relationship Geyelin would later argue to continue conducting, if
under slightly different phrasing, in the mid-seventies. An October 1957 cable from Paris to
Washington mentioned again the proposed trip to Poland; but rather than asking what Geyelin
could do for the CIA, it forwarded Geyelin’s question of what the CIA could do for him. Geyelin,
it said, was negotiating with the press officer of the Polish embassy, and (in quotes written by
Califano) “asked if the station chief would be willing to provide him with a list of Polish officials
and background information.” He’d asked for “rumors of impending shifts of Polish officials”
and “hoped that the station chief would be able to help him ‘primarily by giving him some idea
of what to look for.’” The memo in which the Paris station chief claimed Geyelin could be a
“very reliable and discreet contact” also said the chief would give Geyelin a “full briefing on
what was going on in France.” In those instances, according to the memo, Geyelin learned in-
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formation for himself when he interacted with the agency. It sounds like what Bob Woodward,
who worked with Geyelin at the Post, said to me a few weeks ago. “You know,” he said, “your
grandfather was so smart, my suspicion is he used the CIA more than the CIA used him.”66
The last example on Califano’s list referenced a trip Geyelin made to Cuba in 1964. Before then, all the examples had been concentrated in the 1950s, with the last reported contact before 1964 having taken place in 1959 (according to Califano’s memo). But a CIA memo written
in December 1975—in response, said Lansdale, to a request to the Agency from the Pike Committee for “any information indicating that ‘Geyelin was a source of this office’”—noted that
Geyelin was contacted in September of 1964, while stationed at the Washington Bureau of the
Journal (having returned from his positions abroad). The contact was related to a trip Geyelin
had recently taken to Cuba, and indicated, according to the memo, that Geyelin “had furnished
two reports to the CIA contact.” Califano inserted a bracketed note: “[Geyelin said that he wrote
no reports for the CIA. This later turned out to be true.]” Califano, the memo notes, asked Lansdale to check whether the “reports” had simply been articles Geyelin had published following his
trip.
And then another man walked into the room. Califano left out his name, writing only
“_____ _____,” whom he described as “occasionally acting general counsel of the CIA.” The
men talked about the next letter, one Geyelin and Califano were requesting of the CIA, and
which was meant to clarify (or clear) Geyelin’s relations to the Agency.67 Califano wanted a let-
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ter indicating the year in which Geyelin was employed by the CIA—1950 to 1951—and affirming that Geyelin didn’t conform to any of the four categories of covert relationships listed in the
Church report.
Califano read the man excerpts from the report describing the four types of relationships
then-director Colby mentioned. All were described as "covert," but while the first three types involved full- or part-time journalists paid for their undercover work overseas, the last type included only “journalists with whom CIA maintains unpaid, occasional, covert contact,” what the
Committee termed “the kind of contact that journalists have with any other department of the
U.S. Government in the routine performance of their journalistic duties…. The difference, of
course, is that the relationship is covert.” As the Committee described it, that fourth type of relationship involved no exchange of money, and was typically contained to occasional phone calls,
lunches, or interviews in which information would be “exchanged or verified.” The journalist
would either volunteer information, or be requested by the CIA to provide some sort of information about people with whom he was in contact. Despite my reading of the material in Geyelin’s
201 file, at least as recorded by Califano, the unnamed man from the CIA said Geyelin “would
not fit” into any of the four categories. 68
Lansdale “expressed concern” that the agency might find itself having to provide similar
letters to “every reporter in Washington,” should it provide one to Geyelin; Califano said
Geyelin’s case was special, because of the “nasty rumors in Washington” about the Post’s editorial page being “soft on the CIA.” “The problem,” he recorded in the memo, “went to the integrity
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of the editorial process.” They left with an agreement: Califano would provide a draft of a letter
from the CIA, which could be in response to a drafted letter from Geyelin. Geyelin, he said,
wouldn’t print his letter on the editorial page of the Post. He just wanted to show it to “those who
made nasty and unfounded accusations about any relationship of his to the CIA” after the agreedupon end date of his employment, in December 1951. Mr. Lansdale made a quip about how
“everyone wanted to get away from the CIA.” Geyelin said no. He just wanted an accurate
statement.
The two men went back to the CIA a few weeks later, on May 18, to meet with a representative of the domestic contact division, “Mr. Ziemer.” The memo from that meeting records
entries from a CIA record similar to those Geyelin's “201 file,” but focused on contacts made to
Geyelin while he was on American soil. In December 1957, the New York CIA office cabled the
D.C. headquarters to say “a man named Phil Geyelin might be able to provide foreign intelligence for them.” He was met in March 1958 by a CIA domestic contact, but “nothing came of
the conversation.” In April 1965, a CIA cable indicated that Geyelin should be contacted when
he was available; in May 1968, there was a cable indicating the contact had never been made. In
March of 1968, a cable noted “a decision that the CIA find out where Geyelin was,” since he
might be worth contacting for a debriefing in Washington on his impressions of West Germany,
Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan and France; the debriefing, though, never took place.
And the reports on Cuba? Lansdale said that, contrary to his previous comments, the CIA
had no reports from him as a result of that trip. The “reports” were written by a CIA agent who
had interviewed Geyelin about his trip to Cuba on September 18, 1964, at Geyelin’s home. The
agent’s report said “he seemed friendly and cooperative and provided the interviewer with re-
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portable information on the Cuban budget.” The Washington field office cited him as a source of
its material on Cuba as a result of the report, but—and Califano took care to quote Lansdale directly in his memo—“These are the only reports that the CIA has any record of.” 69
Those memos are the most substantial information I have on what the CIA kept on my
grandfather. My FOIA requests have been in for thirteen months; I’m told they might be fulfilled
by this June. The rest that I have is conjecture, and small bits of other memories of the meeting.
Califano wrote about the experience in his 2004 memoir. “We were astonished,” he wrote, at the
cables suggesting Geyelin might have been able to provide foreign intelligence for the agency.
“The cables were filled with agent reports of insignificant conversations blown all out of proportion.”70 And Howard Bray, who wrote a Post retrospective in 1980 for which Geyelin was interviewed, noted the issue of a cryptonym, or code name, assigned to Geyelin, and not mentioned in
any of Califano’s memos. 71 On the phone this year, Califano most strongly remembered “something to do with Cuba.”72
Looking again at the memos this winter, I got caught up on the chronology. The first
memo is dated April 29, 1976, though it doesn’t state the date of the meeting. From the tone and
specificity, my impulse is to understand it as having been written soon after the meeting itself—if
not on the day of the meeting, then only a few days later. The second memo is dated May 24,
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1976, and seems to be from the domestic counterpart to the earlier meeting, which focused on
international contacts. But there’s a third memo, dated as having been written in between the
two, on May 3, 1976, though it discusses a meeting that occurred a few weeks earlier: on April
16, before Califano and my grandfather went to the CIA together. At the time of the April 16
meeting, neither of the men had yet reviewed Geyelin’s file, and Califano was operating alone.
He met “Dick” Lansdale and Bush at the CIA for “approximately 30 minutes” to speak
“on the subject of Phil Geyelin.” Califano, it says, told then-director Bush that “potential erroneous rumors” alleging Geyelin had worked for the CIA while a professional reporter might lead
to charges that the Post was “soft on the CIA” because of Geyelin’s relationship to the Agency.
Califano didn’t want to invoke Freedom of Information and Privacy Act procedures to get the
records, because the Agency was a few months behind in responding to FOIA requests (a problem they don’t seem to have addressed), and the Geyelin issue, he said, demanded “immediate
attention.” Califano wanted to see whatever they had. He also wanted a formal statement from
the CIA stating the exact years of Geyelin's employment, and that he “performed no services for
the Agency” after that period. Lansdale explained that the Agency didn’t typically give “opinion
letters of this type—especially when everyone is trying to run away” from the CIA. “Nevertheless,” wrote Califano, “Mr. Bush requested that Lansdale draft such a letter immediately.”
Though he’d just assured Califano that he’d receive a statement regarding Geyelin’s employment, Bush admitted that the Agency couldn’t, at that time, “locate Mr. Geyelin’s personnel
file.” They had found a personnel card, which showed Geyelin had been employed from 1951 to
1952. Following a 48-hour check, Bush said no evidence had been found that Geyelin “ever performed services” for the CIA following 1951-1952. “In conclusion,” stated the memo, “the Di-
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rector seemed prepared at the close of this meeting to provide the formal statement suggested by
Mr. Califano, and he stated he would clear any statement through Mr. Califano when it was
drafted.”73
This meeting must have happened before the meeting discussed in the April 29 memo,
because Califano hadn’t yet reviewed the Agency’s records—he was there to demand permission
to do so. It’s unsurprising that Califano would demand a letter clearing Geyelin’s name without,
or before, knowing the CIA’s account of what had to be cleared. Califano was there on behalf of
Geyelin, and Geyelin insisted he’d had no improper Agency contact since officially leaving employment (by his account, in 1951; by the Agency account mentioned here, in 1952). But it
seems that the Agency hadn’t fully reviewed his file yet, either—only performing a 48-hour
check—and still, it only took thirty minutes to convince Bush to write a letter outlining Geyelin's
conduct in words that fit Geyelin's mid-seventies motivations: in which any connections would
be "cleared up," if not minimized, or erased.
To write that letter, Califano told me on the phone, was “an act of enormous decency” on
the part of Bush. It wasn’t common practice. “They just never did things like that. That wasn’t
the only issue we had with the CIA in terms of the Washington Post. I mean, we had plenty of
issues in those days. The other relationships—I think, I don’t know, my knowledge is; I have no
knowledge of his involvement with the CIA at any point, when he was in Paris or anywhere. But
the only—I do vividly remember when that rumor started circulating Washington,” he said. “It
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., “Memorandum For File: Washington Post – Phil Geyelin,” May 3,
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would have been very damaging to him. He was the editorial page director of the Washington
Post.”
I asked Califano why he believed my grandfather when he claimed not to have had any
inappropriate contact with the Agency after he left employment. “Because I knew him!” he said.
“And I knew if he said it wasn’t so, it wasn’t so. He wouldn’t lie to me. And I knew it could be
very damaging to him professionally. He was just straight. And he would never have lied to me.
And would never have asked me to do something unless he thought it was important.” 74
So Califano reached out to Director Bush in April of 1976. He remembers the conversation. “‘You know,’” he told Bush, “’this is his life and his career.’” Bush, Califano remembers,
said, “fine, I’ll do it.”
In late May and early June, Geyelin drafted a series of potential letters to Bush delineating his prior relationship to the Agency, as well as a series of versions of Bush's response. Califano gave him edits. In the files Geyelin kept, there are copies of three drafts, and references to
more. The specifics were important, sometimes subtle, and it was significant that any resulting
letter from Bush would cover all the potential notes of contention. Geyelin acknowledged the
need for nuance in a note he wrote to Califano on June 2nd, accompanying his latest “substantial
re-write.” Califano, it seems, wanted him to cut it shorter; but, wrote Geyelin, “it seems to me
impossible to ignore the background,” and necessary to “make some part of the case for writing
me a letter,” given the preoccupation with setting a precedent. And, he said,
Finally, I am always leery of the blanket denial—‘no connection’—when
the files, which may or may not see the light of day at some point, clearly record
connections. That is why it seemed worthwhile trying to get into my letter, and
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his, the distinction between normal journalistic contacts, however they may be
viewed by CIA operatives, and any of the four working relationships set forth in
Bush’s answer.
Anyway, let’s talk about it.75, 76
His draft attempts to explain the difference between his rumored relationship with the
CIA and the actual (and existent) nature of their interactions. Califano would edit out much of
the exposition. The differences between the June 2nd draft and the June 9th draft (which was submitted to Lansdale, and Bush) will be noted with strikethroughs, for information written by
Geyelin and deleted by Califano, and italics, for information added through Califano’s edits.
Dear Mr. Bush:
From December 1950 to December 1951, during the Korean War I was
employed by the Central Intelligence Agency at a rather low level in Washington,
on a leave of absence from the Wall Street Journal. At no time did I serve outside
Washington and at no time after my resignation did I have any connection with
the CIA other than open, professional contacts with news sources in the course of
my duties as a foreign correspondent and, later, as a Washington diplomatic correspondent for the Journal; these contacts consisted of nothing more than the normal
exchanges that take place between reporters and officials of any government
agency and as reporters seeking confirmation of information they have gathered,
or receiveing briefings in advance of specific assignments. , and as government
officials, for their part, occasionally ask questions of their own.
Recently, however, there have been rumors circulating in Washington that
I had [some sort of] a continuing working relationship with CIA after December,
1951, while I was employed as a newspaperman. In one specific instance, a retired official of the agency indicated to a journalist colleague and also to a staff
member of the Pike Committee his “impression” that I had worked for the agency
in Germany in the early 1950’s while simultaneously employed by the Wall Street
Journal – an allegation that is false on its face since I was in the Washington Bureau of the Journal at that time.
Because of these rumors, I requested, as you know, I requested an opportunity to review any files or records bearing on any relationship with CIA that
75
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somebody in the aAgency might have thought I had after 1951. This review entirely conformed the fact that my connection with CIA terminated with my resignation in December 1951, apart from the contacts of a working reporter that which
I have already described.
In the present atmosphere, however, it is not enough for me to know it this
fact, and to assert it; the rumors apparently continue. Because I profoundly believe in the view, shared by most members of my profession, that any covert relationship with branch of government creates an intolerable and unprofessional conflict of interest for working journalists, these rumors offend me. They may even
be damaging. These rumors deeply trouble me and may even be personally damaging. But my main reason for concern is that whatever damage they may do to
me, they such rumors are potentially far more very damaging to the integrity and
effectiveness of The Washington Post – an institution to which I have devoted the
last ten years of my career and one whose reputation is of far more importance
than mine — because, in my present capacity as Editor of the this newspaper’s
Editorial Page, I am responsible for its opinions on a range of issues bearing on
involving the CIA, including specifically the question of whether the aAgency
ought to have covert working relationships of any sort with the press.
For this reason, I would very much appreciate your checking the files personally and confirming that I, in fact, had no connection with the CIA after 1951,
other than the ordinary contacts of any practicing journalist, so that I can put these
rumors can be put to rest.77
Califano struck through the suggestion that Geyelin might have supplied valuable information to the agency, deleting the note that government officials might, at points, ask journalists
questions themselves, and deleting the allusion to Bross’s anecdotal evidence. He shifted the narrative away from one of personal redemption, and towards the institutional integrity of the Washington Post. He added the word “covert”—the common denominator between all four types of
relationships presented by the Church report—as a descriptor of what the relationship (however
it existed) was not. Given that the CIA documents explicitly demonstrated some sort of connection, which Geyelin didn't later deny, I imagine the men took issue with that word, and especially
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its connotations of collusion, or consistency. At base, it seems Geyelin didn't want anyone him to
imagine he'd had what he described as a "working relationship" with the agency.
Califano sent Lansdale a draft of Bush's response on June 11, 1976, underneath a cover
letter:
Dear Dick:
Per our conversation, I am enclosing a proposed exchange of correspondence between Mr. Geyelin and Director Bush. Please give me a call when you
have read them and we can discuss them.
The proposed letter claimed that Geyelin’s relationship with the Agency never resembled
any of the types outlined by former CIA Director William Colby, on pages 195 to 197 of the
Church Committee report. “While on one or two occasions,” the letter finished, “CIA representatives overtly contacted you to obtain your impressions of the nations you had visited, at no time
since you left the employ of the Agency have you been involved in any of the covert relationships described in the Senate Select Committee’s Report.”
That letter, too, went through another series of drafts before Bush sent Geyelin an official
response, on CIA stationary. The final draft is shorter, and more definite, hinging on the second
of two paragraphs (the first of which only claims that Geyelin’s brief employment ended in
1951). “Additionally,” reads the second paragraph,
there has been a limited and intermittent association with you in the 1950’s and early 1960’s. As a foreign correspondent you were in touch with Agency representatives from time to time, in line with the not unusual practice of correspondents, but
you were not an employee (since 1951), and received no compensation. Our records
reveal no association contacts at all subsequent to 1964.78
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Bush’s final, official letter to Geyelin recycles Califano’s latest-draft language almost
completely, sticking to the script he and Lansdale had discussed. And it absorbs Geyelin’s lastminute edit, written in blue pen: a replacement of “association” with “contacts,” a distinction I
read as one of alliance versus engagement. Alliance would be unsupportable; engagement,
Geyelin would later argue, is unavoidable.
Dear Mr. Geyelin:
Upon receipt of your recent request to me, I have caused a thorough search
of Agency records to be made to determine the matter of your relationship with
this Agency. I can confirm to you that the records indicate you were employed by
this Agency some years ago for a brief period, from December 1950 to December
1951. There is no record of any employment since that time.
Additionally, there have been a limited and intermittent number of contacts with you in the 1950’s and early 1960’s in your role as a foreign correspondent and consistent with the usual practice of such correspondents, but you have
not been an employee since 1951 and have received no compensation since then.
Our records reveal no contact at all subsequent to 1964.
Sincerely,
George Bush
Director79
The only difference between the last draft and the official letter is an affirmation, in the
second paragraph, of Geyelin’s behavior as “consistent with the usual practice of such correspondents”—an even gentler evaluation than that of the draft, in which Geyelin’s conduct was
described as “not unusual.” The rest is unchanged, beyond the addition of Bush’s signature.
***

Meanwhile, Bross sent Geyelin a letter. It's dated June 2nd, 1976, by which point Geyelin
was already drafting the letter Bush had promised to send him.
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Bross wrote that after speaking with Geyelin and Helms, he concluded “that my memory
has failed me or that I misunderstood whatever it was that I was told which suggested your association with the Agency overseas.” He explained his choice to give Geyelin’s name to the Pike
committee with, “My point was that, in my time and area at least, it was not the practice to use
journalists for various reasons which I explained. One exception, in my opinion, proved the
rule.” His leak to the Committee was, as he understood, the source of the recent “various investigations” into Geyelin’s “possible connections”; and his misunderstanding, or memory, was “the
whole story,” as far as he knew.
“Having said all this,” he wrote, “let me go on to reiterate my astonishment that a brief
period of collaboration with the United States Government should create so much static.” In his
day, and his area, he said, there was a policy against using journalists covering “communist or
other unfriendly areas,” given that it might put them in danger. And given that people in the intelligence community could have read a newspaper, there was no real motivation to pay the journalists, besides that it might commit them to disclose their sources (a practice otherwise considered
journalistically unethical). “Where information affecting national security is concerned,” he said,
“this can hardly be said to be a bad thing. If journalists choose to recognize a higher obligation to
their publishers than they do to the government of the Republic this is their prerogative.” There
had never been any practice, he said, of forcing journalists to “work for their government” if they
chose not to—but “it hardly follows,” he said,” “that if they do choose to do so they are committing some kind of immoral or criminal act.” He went on, referencing and refuting a Charles Seib
editorial, "News Business, Spy Business,” printed in the January 30, 1976 issue of the Post, that
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called for strict self-policing of journalists towards their fellow journalists, and their potential,
and unethical, ties to intelligence agencies.
Journalists and intelligence agents are both presumably concerned with
obtaining factually accurate data. Both occasionally use methods which may look
a little unscrupulous. Both are essential and enjoy and are entitled to certain measures of protection. Neither, as far as I can judge, deserves some kind of sacerdotal status.
Everybody wants a free press. Everybody recognizes the competence and
dedication of a large section of the press, the brilliance and wisdom of some reporters and the fact that a good many reporters are dismally deficient in any or
certainly all of these qualities. Everybody recognizes the public service rendered
by the press in its coverage and analysis of the news and its value for entertainment purposes. Everybody also recognizes that the press is run by proprietors who
are not averse to turning an honest penny for themselves or their employees.
None of this explains to me the charges of apostasy which are leveled
against members of the press for agreeing, for example, to supply the government
with information about the activities of Soviet agents, or suspected agents in West
Germany. In a recent column Charles Seib wants to free not only the American
press but all the press everywhere from the “taint” of CIA corruption. Thus all the
press of the world, in a sort of ecumenical alliance, should band together against
CIA (i.e. the US Government). Should the governments of the world perhaps band
together against the press?
Mr. Seib, in his indignation, has got a lot of things mixed up. The fact that
some journalists worked for CIA for intelligence purposes does not mean that they
had anything to do with “polluting” the media. Assuming that by “polluting” Mr.
Seib means inserting false information under false attribution into the media for
the purpose of causing dissension between adversaries—the Soviets and the
Cubans for example—this was actually, as far as I know or the record shows, a
very minor part of the CIA’s activity. Nor, as far as can be determined, is there any
evidence that the journalists, whose recruitment by CIA Seib complains about,
were used for this purpose. Most of CIA’s informational dissemination activities
were designed to promote the circulation of information about events which
would otherwise be suppressed or misrepresented—particularly behind the Iron
Curtain. RFE programs, for example, told it exactly as it was.
From Bill Colby’s and other testimony before Congressional committees I
gather that use of journalists by CIA has increased in recent years. I understand
that George Bush has ended the practice. For the practical reasons which I have
suggested above I believe that this is the right decision.
I am sorry that quite unintentionally I have mislead (sic) people into believing that you at one time worked for CIA overseas, under journalistic cover.
This has obviously caused you embarrassment which I sincerely regret. However,
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the conduct which you are (falsely) accused of hardly justifies anathema. Or so it
seems to me.
With warm personal regards.
Faithfully yours,
John A. Bross80
The letter reads as a hedged apology: Bross said he was sorry for the trouble he’s
caused, but also that he didn’t believe there should have been any trouble. Everyone, he said,
was over-reacting to a non-problem.
But the non-problem grew into a problem for Geyelin once the rumor of his “association” with the CIA—a phrasing Geyelin had deemed too dangerous to be included in the letter
meant to re-affirm his reputation—was seriously considered by his colleagues, or social world,
or readership. Bross redacted his memory, or rewrote it, as soon as Geyelin asked him to. He
might really have thought himself to have misspoken. He might have considered himself, and
Geyelin, victims of confused semantics whose significance had only recently begun to matter.
Or it might just not have meant much to him to erase his accusations. Given that he disagreed
with the premise of “moral contamination,” what was it to him to cleanse a man of a questionable, or false, contaminant?
Reading the online theories, and learning of the mid-seventies rumors to which my grandfather felt vulnerable, I was surprised, and suspicious—but suspicious both of him and of the
rumors on which my suspicion rested. From what I’d grown up knowing about my grandfather’s
journalism, his writing, especially in the late sixties and early seventies, was pretty explicitly
counter to the government agenda. He was credited with turning the Post’s editorial page against
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the Vietnam War, and wrote anti-Vietnam editorials for which he won the 1970 Pulitzer Prize; he
was involved in the Post’s publication of the Pentagon Papers; he supported Woodward and
Bernstein as they stuck out the Watergate investigations amidst other journalists' skepticism.81 If
he were under the thumb of the CIA—which is to say, under the thumb of the American government—then how do I explain his work in the decades leading up to the Year of Intelligence?
Bross described the ordeal as an instance of faulty memory, and a mistake. But during my
grandfather’s meetings at the agency, a 201 file was uncovered, and it did show a history of
“contacts” that don’t seem completely innocuous, or random, at least from my reading of Califano's memos. Agency members seem to have identified him as a potential source, repeatedly, or
at least as someone useful. He did, according to the file, insist that his cooperation was contingent on not “interfering with or embarrassing the Journal”; but the Agency also repeatedly told
him, in the fifties, that he was “not to represent himself as nor is he to be represented as an employee of the CIA.” 82
Geyelin called them “normal journalistic contacts” in his note to Califano, while they
were drafting the letter for Bush to sign. He didn’t want to make a “blanket denial” that there was
“no connection,” given that the files clearly recorded them. And in the final letter, the Agency
formally stated that there were no “contacts” between the Agency and my grandfather after 1964,
around when he began reporting on the escalating situation Vietnam. But even if those earlier
visits were just social, or commonplace, the whole ordeal—both the files uncovered, and the way
Geyelin and Califano handled the situation—speak to a general chumminess with the American
81
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government that I find to be at odds with the understanding I always had of my grandfather: that
of a dissenter, a protester with a pen. Unless, of course, Vietnam changed Geyelin's own relationship to the government, so that by the mid-seventies he couldn't relate to his earlier mindset, either.
Maybe the contacts, as reported by the Agency, did end in 1964, twelve years after he
formally left the Agency. I haven’t found much to substantiate my suspicion that his book, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, was CIA-sponsored, besides a few other people who have similarly noticed the connection (and similarly not gotten much further). But on the whole, the books
I’ve read, the notes and letters and transcripts I’ve found, and the people I’ve spoken to point to
what, for me, has been a surprising intimacy. Why was it that in 1976, Califano could call “Dick”
Lansdale and get the Agency to perform what Califano called “an act of enormous decency,” an
atypical choice to write a letter on my grandfather’s terms, when the CIA “just never did things
like that”? Why actively preserve the public integrity of a man whose work caused them so much
trouble? What actually happened?
***
I found Califano’s memos, and the letters between Bross, Geyelin, Helms, and Bush, in
Box 1 of the 127 boxes in the Philip L. Geyelin collection at the Library of Congress. It was the
first box I looked at, on my first day this summer sitting at a desk in the windowless Library.
Every time I went to the librarians’ desk, to request another box, I used a golf pencil to fill out
the index card: “Geyelin” for researcher, “Geyelin” for collection requested. Some of the librarians liked that.
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The boxes had been filed there by staff of the Library’s Manuscript Division. They designated the first eleven boxes to Geyelin’s “Personal File,” organizing the folders inside by alphabet. “Central Intelligence Agency” came after “Business Cards, Undated” and “Calendar,
1987.” Folders 4 and 5 held all of John Bross’s correspondence with Richard Helms, and Stuart
Loory; all of Geyelin’s drafts, for George Bush to sign; clippings Geyelin annotated; scrawled
notes to himself; a drawing of a “rogue elephant”; Congressional records; a Xerox from Book I
of the Church report. I remember I went outside and called my boyfriend and said it felt weird,
this whole project felt weird—why did he keep all these things? Why were they left where I
could find them, on the first day? The alphabet alone didn’t seem like an answer.
I went back inside and photographed everything in the folders, and then started on the
next one. “Correspondence.” Folder 6 had a letter he wrote his mom in 1937, when he worked
for a summer on a ranch in Wyoming. “3 days ago we killed a ‘rattler’ (snake) up in the upper
pasture,” he told her. “It was very exciting.” He signed it “Lots Of LOVE” with at least three underscores on each word and a heart in place of the Love’s O.83
This summer I was giving a woman named Susan Braden a ride from her house in D.C.
out to Virginia, where my aunt and uncle live. They’re friends, from when they were kids. I was
going there to look at boxes in the attic, but also to talk to her—she used to be in the CIA herself,
as was her dad, Tom Braden, a friend of my grandfather’s, who similarly left the CIA for a career
in journalism. I recently found their family picture in a photo album my grandmother made in the
late fifties, mostly of their time in Europe: Braden, the future host of CNN’s Crossfire, sits with
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six of his eight kids, the real-life inspiration for the network comedy Eight is Enough. Susan
thinks their families met through the Alsops, Stewart and Joseph. Joe Alsop, too, later faced rumors of inappropriate ties to the CIA.84 Mr. and Mrs. Stewart Alsop show up in the table setting
featured in the 1961 Vogue spread starring my grandmother, as she put together a dinner party for
friends including the ambassador of Spain, the Alsops, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., then Special
Assistant to the President.85, 86 Braden and Alsop and Geyelin had all been in the same clique, she
said, of friends and columnists “running American thought.” “What columnist has that kind of
power anymore?” she asked me, rhetorically. “But they did, and they loved it.” She remembers
them all sitting around, smoking cigars and drinking and holding the newspaper out, sharing information like they were “trading horses.” John A. Bross, the CIA man who leaked my grandfather’s name to the Pike committee, was Susan Braden’s godfather. I asked her about the letters,
which I’d found a few weeks earlier. “Yeah,” she said. “That was a shitty thing he did.”
At a certain point it started pouring, raining so hard I was just following the red lights of
the car in front of me on the highway. I remember pulling off, eventually, and the rain letting up,
and driving through the wet green hills, talking about the CIA. “Oh, yeah,” she said, “I think
your grandpa worked for my dad. That’s what he said.”
Sitting with Braden and my aunt on my aunt’s porch in Virginia that summer, I heard
about them growing up and watching their parents’ social and professional lives intersect, and
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intertwine. They rattled off names of CIA friends of their parents; they talked about dinner parties with certain tables where shared information couldn’t leave the party. There were parties
with Richard Helms; Henry Kissinger; Dick Holbrooke; other journalists. Big egos, competition;
people who were in, people who were out. People who were “boring.” People who came from a
certain social subset of the World War Two generation. “The people that ran the CIA,” Braden
felt, “and that ran the United States, were white Anglo-Saxon Protestant men who all came from
Ivy League schools and had a kind of fellowship with one another that they developed during the
second world war. They were victorious in the war, so they had a very strong sense of their righteousness and their goodness and the purity of their thoughts and their way of life.”87 In the early
years of the Cold War, they saw themselves as on the same side.
My aunt grew up after my grandfather had officially left the CIA. Braden’s father left a
number of years later; but still, for most of her life she knew him as a journalist, rather than an
agent. To both of them, their fathers were political writers who cared about disseminating information, not collaborating in its cover-up. That, in the mind of my aunt and Susan Braden, was
why both their fathers eventually left the CIA: they didn’t like being on the side that kept the secrets. Braden repeated to me what her father had often told her: “It’s the government’s job to
keep the secrets, and the media’s job to find them out.” Their fathers liked being the truth-seekers, they said. Their social ties to the Agency, and to the American government, helped them uncover the information they published. Communication was an asset.
***
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A few weeks later I was back in Washington and waiting at a sweaty shuttle stop to go to
the National Archives. I wanted to use their CREST system, the CIA’s database of declassified
material and other CIA files. With it I found, among other things, a transcript of a television appearance my grandfather made on October 29, 1977, over a year after his name-clearing trip to
the CIA. He was a guest on On the Record, a show hosted by Sheila Raub Weidenfeld on WRC
TV, Washington’s NBC-owned Channel Four. The episode featured Geyelin, Seymour Hersh
(who had written the Times series), William Colby (the former CIA director who had first admitted to the media-CIA ties, and who had stepped down two years earlier, in 1975), and Jack Nelson (the Washington bureau chief of the L.A. Times), and invited them all to speak on air about
the relationship between intelligence and the media. “Just what is the relationship between the
CIA and the press?” asked the host. “To what extent does the CIA control the media? And are
there secrets that should be kept?” ,88 89
The episode aired at 7 p.m. nine days after Carl Bernstein, one half of the WoodwardBernstein Watergate reporting duo, published an exposé in Rolling Stone on clandestine relationships between American journalists and intelligence agencies. After leaving the Washington Post
earlier that year, where he had been a colleague of Geyelin’s, Bernstein had spent six months investigating a phenomenon of which he claimed the American public only knew a piece. Titled
“The CIA and the Media: How America’s Most Powerful News Media Worked Hand in Glove
with the Central Intelligence Agency and Why the Church Committee Covered it Up,” the article
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claimed that the Committee had been persuaded by CIA director George Bush and former director Colby to restrict their investigations of press ties to the Agency, and then to misrepresent the
scale of their findings in the published reports. The nine pages of Book I of the Church report in
which press relations are explicitly tackled (and the pages defining the “covert relationships”
Geyelin denied having participated in) were, in Bernstein’s words, “deliberately vague and sometimes misleading.” They didn’t, he wrote, report the number of journalists who actually performed covert operations for the Agency; and they didn't sufficiently describe newspaper executives’ complicity with the work.
In all, Bernstein claimed that over 400 American journalists “secretly carried out assignments” for the C.I.A. in the twenty-five years prior to the article’s population—not the fifty people claimed by the Church report. The report limited its number to fifty, said Bernstein, because
the committee staff only had the resources to study fifty. Senator Gary Hart, who served on the
committee, had told Bernstein that the material reported under “Covert Relationships with the
United States Media” (the section from which I’ve quoted, in Book I), “hardly reflects what we
found. There was a prolonged and elaborate negotiation [with the CIA] over what would be
said.” One Agency official claimed “The Vietnam War tore everything to pieces—shredded the
consensus and threw it in the air.” Another “Agency official” agreed. “Today, a lot of these guys
vehemently deny they had any relationship with the Agency.” Most of the relationships had been
terminated since 1973; but not all.
The lede features my grandfather’s friend, Joe Alsop. “In 1953,” it begins,
Joseph Alsop, then one of America’s leading syndicated columnists, went to the
Philippines to cover an election. He did not go because he was asked to do so by

!57
his syndicate. He did not go because he was asked to do so by the newspapers that
printed his column. He went at the request of the CIA. 90
Bernstein claimed that the program had begun “during the earliest stages of the Cold
War” under Allen Dulles, who ran covert operations as Deputy Director for Plans beginning in
1950, and became director of the Agency in 1953. Journalists, he thought, would be afforded
more access and freedom of movement than agents would be able to obtain through typical types
of cover. They are in the business of finding out information; they get to make long-term relationships with sources in his host country; they grow familiar with people in government, academia, the military, the scientific community. Most of the participating journalists, said Bernstein,
acted as “eyes and ears” for the CIA, as they did for their publications. Some did more—planted
information; hosted parties meant to introduce American spies to their foreign counterparts; distributed “black” propaganda; funneled CIA money and instructions to “controlled” members of
foreign governments; used their offices or residences as “drops” for sensitive information traveling between agents.
Relationships often began informally, with a drink, or dinner. The formal relationships, if
they came, would come later; sometimes a pledge of secrecy was required. And the relationships
could benefit the journalists, as well—maybe they got some good stories from Agency contacts
who could make suggestions for items of interest, or gossip. Beyond “cover,” Dulles created a
“debriefing” protocol: American correspondents returning from abroad could offer their notes
and impressions gathered during reporting tasks. Bernstein claimed that those procedures, at
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least, were still continuing at the time of the article’s publication. The practice, on the whole, was
most popular in Western Europe.
And American publishers, said Bernstein, were willing to offer up their employees in the
fight against “global Communism”—so the infiltration wasn’t insidious on the part of the CIA,
but rather a communal effort. He quoted Hugh Morrow, a former Saturday Evening Post correspondent, who was Vice President Rockefeller’s press secretary in 1977, on the 1950s practice of
meeting media men: “There would be these guys from the CIA flashing ID cards and looking
like they belonged to the Yale Club. It got to be so routine that you felt a little miffed if you
weren’t asked.” Some were paid; many were strictly voluntary. Some of the involved journalists
were Pulitzer winners.
Within the CIA, claimed Bernstein, many journalist-operatives enjoyed special status,
given their social similarity to their Agency counterparts: similar pedigrees, similar schools, similar social circles, similarly fashionable liberalism, shared “‘old boy’ network that constituted
something of an establishment elite in the media, politics and academia of postwar America.”
They were there for national service, or out of patriotic compulsion. Bernstein quoted someone
he identifies as an “Agency official”: they were “people who worked together during World War
II and never got over it. Then in the Fifties and Sixties there was a national consensus about a
national threat.”
Bernstein went on to list names of the few CIA deputies with full knowledge, at the time,
of their operatives. Contacts with the news agencies were initiated by Agency men including
Frank Wisner, Cord Meyer Jr., Richard Bissell, Desmond Fitzgerald, Tracy Barnes, Thomas
Karamessines and Richard Helms. It’s a list heavy with names of my grandfather’s friends, col-
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leagues, acquaintances. “The Founding Fathers [of the CIA] were close personal friends of ours,”
said Alsop, who Bernstein claimed performed clandestine work for the Agency, as did his brother, columnist Stewart Alsop. “It was a social thing, my dear fellow. I never received a dollar….
I’ve done things for them when I thought they were the right thing to do.” “I’m proud they asked
me and proud to have done it,” he’s quoted earlier. “The notion that a newspaperman doesn’t
have a duty to his country is perfect balls.”
The article doesn’t mention the Wall Street Journal by name, but it does devote space to
the Washington Post (which Bernstein had left earlier that year, prior to spending six months on
this article). He described Phil Graham, the Post’s editor until 1963, as “somebody you could get
help from,” quoting a former deputy director of the Agency. “Frank Wisner dealt with him,”
claimed the deputy. Graham and Wisner were close friends. But Geyelin didn’t arrive at the Post
until a few years later, when the paper was in Katharine’s hands, where it fell after Phil Graham
committed suicide in 1963.91 “Information about Agency dealings with the Washington Post
newspaper is extremely sketchy,” wrote Bernstein. CIA officials, he claimed, mentioned that
some Post stringers had been CIA employees, but that they didn’t know if anyone in the Post
management was aware, and they also make no statements that and Post staff members had
maintained covert relationships with the CIA during their employment by the Post. He then included a footnote: “Philip Geyelin, editor of the Post editorial page, worked for the Agency before joining the Post.” Bernstein doesn’t seem to know what to do with the information. Either
that, or he’s expecting his audience to make inferences.
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Weidenfeld asked Geyelin about it a week later, on her primetime television show. But
first, she posed a question to the group.
SHEILA RAUB WEIDENFELD: Okay, I have a question for everybody.
Jack, just one second.
How valid is Carl Bernstein’s contention that over 400, or approximately 400
members of the press worked, over the past 25 years, for the CIA?
WILLIAM COLBY: It’s nonsense.
WEIDENFELD: It’s nonsense?
COLBY: He destroys at least one of the 400 in his own account, where he says
that Joe Alsop was talking to Des Fitzgerald and Des said, ‘Why don’t you go
over to the Philippines to cover an election?’ And Joe decided to go. But is that
working for the CIA?
WEIDENFELD: Well, now are you saying that Joe Alsop was not?
PHILIP GEYELIN: Well, that’s the weakness of the whole thing. It’s 400 apples
and oranges and pears and grapefruits. It ranges all the way from people who had
casual conversations with CIA officials and sources to people he claims were on
the payroll; and you can’t lump all that. I mean you can reach 400 if you lump all
that together, but it’s a meaningless total, I think.
COLBY: Absolutely.
We certainly used the press. There’s no question about it. But the number is very
much smaller than…
WEIDENFELD: You were used, Jack. Sy, even you were in…
COLBY: No, no, no. That’s a totally different thing.
WEIDENFELD: Well, that’s—all right. We’ll get into that in a second.
SEYMOUR HERSH: But you certainly have had contact with thousands of reporters.
COLBY: I used to run officers who were under journalistic cover in my younger
days, sure. And I had only one rule: that I had nothing to say about what they
submitted to their editors, their American editors. They did favors for me, they did
jobs for me overseas, but they wrote to their editor was between him and the editor (sic). That’s just a rule we had.
JACK NELSON: Do you look back on that, though, now as something you just as
soon not have done?
COLBY: No, I don’t see—as long as the government is not writing what American people read in the newspapers, I think…
GEYELIN: You don’t think it compromises a reporter to be on the government
payroll?
COLBY: Not particularly. These are mostly stringers and free-lancers, and so
forth. So in that sense, no. But in some cases they were staff people, in those days.
NELSON: Anybody from the Los Angeles Times?
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COLBY: No, I don’t think there were any, and I’m not going to talk about particular…
NELSON: I’ve been asked to ask that, you know.
HERSH: Is it impossible that it’s 400? I don’t know. It could be.
COLBY: Oh, I’m pretty sure that’s—I mean if you throw in all the apples and oranges and if you add every newsman who ever talked to a CIA station chief in a
foreign country, then you’d probably get 800, 1,000.
HERSH: Did you get clearances on people that would just come in casually and
talk?
COLBY: No.
HERSH: You didn’t get clearance without their knowledge?
COLBY: Not really. Some that you had some particular reason for having a clearance on ‘em, you’d get a clearance on ‘em. But I don’t think the 400 is set at that
level.
NELSON: I don’t think, incidentally, many journalists would agree with you that
that isn’t a real corrupting influence,…
COLBY: Well, I know that, but…
NELSON: … to have journalists actually serve with the CIA.
COLBY: … I happen to know a lot of very democratic countries where there’s a
very close relationship between their journalism and their intelligence services.
And it certainly hasn’t affected the independence and democracy of those countries. And I’m not going to identify them, but nonetheless.
GEYELIN: Without naming names, that charge has been made about the British
government, and there are an awful lot of British newspapermen who feel very
uncomfortable about those allegations, that are not precise, not specific. You
know, if there are three of them, it compromises all of them.
The group went on to discuss newspaper discretion in publishing stories related to national security—essentially, whether a newspaper should refrain from publishing information if, for example, the CIA approached and requested the newspaper’s restraint. But midway through, Weidenfeld redirected to her opening question: “Just what is the relationship between the CIA and the
press?” Geyelin, she seemed to think, might have the answer.
WEIDENFELD: I want to get back to the journalists. A lot of this has to do with
the three of you and what you think of the CIA. I mean is the CIA an institution
that you honor today? I mean do you think—how do you treat the CIA? Does it
deserve respect, do you think?
HERSH: You’re asking that on public television? Are you kidding?
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WEIDENFELD: Well, I’m going to ask Phil, because, Phil, you know the CIA
better than most people know the CIA.
GEYELIN: If what you’re asking me is did I work for it once, the answer is I did,
for 11 months in 1951, and I quit because I didn’t like the line of work.
WEIDENFELD: Was it the line of work or was it the institution, as it was set up?
GEYELIN: It’s so cellular that I couldn’t see the institution. I only saw what I was
being asked to do.
WEIDENFELD: Which was what, Phil?
GEYELIN: Well, I’m not going to talk about it, because I took the same secrecy
oath that – it’s not important. You can read all about it in the Saturday Evening
Post in the piece by Tom Braden if you’re really that interested. But it was—that
was the CIA 25 years ago. I don’t know what it’s like today.
WEIDENFELD: But you know the institution.
GEYELIN: I respected a lot of people who I met there. I knew, after I got out, a
lot of them as news sources, and I respected a lot of them. I think it’s done terrific
work, in some ways, and it’s had a very bad passage, in my opinion. But what it’s
like today, I don’t know. They don’t tell us. That’s one of the problems.
WEIDENFELD: Well, let’s talk about it today when we get back in just a moment.
[Commercial break.]
I looked up the article Geyelin mentioned, written by his one-time boss, because I did
want to know what he’d been doing. Titled “I’m Glad the CIA is ‘Immoral,’” Tom Braden had
written it in response to a brief (and relatively minor, as compared to the uproar of 1975) scandal
involving the disclosure that the CIA had secretly funded organizations such as the American
Federation of Labor and the National Student Association. The article explained how Braden had
created the department heading these projects, the International Organization Division, in the
early fifties, formally under his boss Frank Wisner. Wisner had what Braden called “one of those
purposefully obscure CIA titles,” Director of Policy Co-ordination, but “everyone knew” he had
really run the CIA since it grew out of the war-time OSS, or Office of Strategic Services, the military intelligence agency created during World War Two. I met Wisner’s son, Ellis, this summer,
with my aunt and uncle. They were family friends, too: his mom, he told me, had been very close
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with my grandmother, and my grandfather had been nice enough to hire him as a sort of assistant
in the early seventies.92, 93
The article outlines the work, and mission, of the I.O.D.: increasing pro-Western sentiment in Europe through funding various projects and foundations meant to highlight the sort of
creative liberty possible in a democratic (read: non-communist) society. In the article, Braden
mentions sending the Boston Symphony Orchestra on tour to Paris; placing an agent in the European intellectual organization, the Congress for Cultural Freedom; and funding Encounter, a
magazine “published in England and dedicated to the proposition that cultural achievement and
political freedom were interdependent.” A CIA agent became an Encounter editor. “Was it ‘immoral,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘disgraceful’?” asked Braden. “Only in the sense that war itself is immoral,
wrong and disgraceful. For the Cold War was and is a war, fought with ideas instead of bombs.
And our country has a clear-cut choice: Either we win the war or lose it.”94 That was what my
grandfather said to read, on air, in 1977, if I wanted to know what he was doing. It’s different
from what he said later—to Harold Bray, for example, for Bray’s 1980 retrospective on the Post.
He was “writing reports about Cuba,” Bray said. Geyelin told him he quit after eleven months
because he “found the work dull.” His boss, Tom Braden, set up a farewell meeting with Allen
Dulles, the head of the CIA, the man Bernstein claims initiated the program involving, or incorporating, journalists with the Agency.
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Braden’s Saturday Evening Post article doesn’t go much more in-depth into the connection between journalism and the CIA than the mention of the funding and staff-planting at Encounter. But the mention of the practice in the article my grandfather specifically cited as an explanation of his own work, while at the CIA, at least demonstrates that he knew how, in some
cases, the CIA did sometimes use journalists, at least at the time that he left the Agency and reentered the world of journalism himself (he had been on leave from the Journal during his eleven
months of employment, and returned there after he quit). And Frank Wisner and Allen Dulles are
two of the men most credited with designing, and implementing, the agency-press connections of
the fifties.96 It’s Wisner’s propaganda machine that historian Hugh Wilford calls the “Mighty
Wurlitzer.”
Privately, Geyelin didn’t deny contacts with the Agency. Really, he was quite clear about
them, as seen in his unedited drafts to Bush: the “normal exchanges” that happen as “reporters
seek confirmation of information they have gathered,” “receive briefings in advance of specific
assignments,” and as “government officials, for their part, occasionally ask questions of their
own.” Most of that was deleted, in later drafts; but it was there, initially, as he figured out how to
phrase it. Its initial inclusion implies that maybe Geyelin, like Braden, didn’t think his practices
were actually “immoral”—but the difference between the two journalists’ reactions to the allegations point to shifted contexts. Braden wrote a public statement of righteous indignation. Geyelin
went to the Director of the CIA and asked the government to sign off on his absolution.
According to the 201 file (or Califano’s memo regarding it), the Agency has no record of
CIA contacts with my grandfather after 1964. But that doesn’t mean he stopped being affiliated,
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at least socially, with the same sphere of Ivy-graduated media and intelligence men he had been
immersed in through the fifties. A 1966 letter from someone whose signature I can’t read encloses what the sender calls “an extremely valuable document,” with a request at the end: “There is a
price for this, actually. Will be in Washington for a few days about the end of October. Would
like to see some China experts, especially your spooky friends, on both economic and political
activities there. Perhaps you could drop a word on my behalf.” 97 I have notecards for joking
toasts my grandfather made on Joe Alsop’s behalf, in or past the 1970s (“Our subject tonight is a
distinguished archeologist… a quintessential connoisor or art and artifacts (sic)… a celebrated
horticulturalist… a closet weight-watcher… very few of us have ever watched him watching his
weight… just watch…”)98 He wrote a 1975 recommendation letter to Maryland Lieutenant Governor on behalf of Frank Wisner’s son, Ellis Wisner, “whose family,” wrote Geyelin, “I have
known for many years. His father, as you may know, was a fine man and a very important figure
in this town.”99 Party guest lists he made in the eighties include the Alsops, and the Helmses. 100
He was friends with Cord Meyer, Jr., who graduated from Yale the year before my grandfather
did, went on to fight as a Marine in World War Two, and later, claimed the New York Times, was
the C.I.A. official in charge of the agency’s propaganda activities after he took the reins from
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Tom Braden.101 , 102 And Colby does mention, here, that it wasn't normal practice to get clearances
on reporters who would "just come in casually and talk"--rather, that "some that you had some
particular reason for having a clearance on ‘em, you’d get a clearance on ‘em."
[Commercial break]
WEIDENFELD: Well, now, what should be mentioned?
NELSON: Well, the fact that, you know, here’s a guy who was in the CIA for 11
months in 1951?
GEYELIN: Yes.
NELSON: And, you know, people still say there’s a nest of CIA people over there
at The Post. Phil Geyelin, hell, you know, the head of the editorial page of the
Washington Post, he used to be in the CIA. And it’s a hard thing for people to sort
of…
WEIDENFELD: That’s the Carl Bernstein thing. It’s the witch hunt that you’re
afraid of, I suppose, isn’t it?
COLBY: Well, it is, very much so. It’s a kind of McCarthyism in reverse.
NELSON: Yes. And also, you know, it isn’t fair, I don’t think, to say that, you
know, 400 people and so forth, when you’re talking about a lot of people who—I
mean I’m sure Seymour Hersh has cooperated with the CIA when he found out
something. He probably, maybe, has told them what he found out in return for
them telling him something he found out.
HERSH: That’s what all reporters…
NELSON: That’s right. I mean I do that. I do…
GEYELIN: There’s another thing about it. If you’ve ever worked for the CIA,
they never stop trying to re-recruit you, I think. I mean that certainly has been—
was my experience. I mean there were all kinds of propositions. And I’m soon
(sic) newspaper guys—most foreign correspondents have probably been approached in one way or another.
WEIDENFELD: For example? Even recently, would you say?
GEYELIN: Well, I’ll give you an example. I was in Paris once and I wanted to go
to Warsaw, so I went and checked in with the embassy people there, including the
CIA, and asked them, you know, who’s big in Warsaw and who should I talk to
and what’s the big story in Poland right now. I figured the CIA would have some
idea.
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Well, I found out later that they cabled back to Washington and suggested maybe I
could do some errands for them while I was there. But nothing came of it. I never
heard about it again, but I’ve seen my files, so I know it’s there.
It sounds as if I was working for them. as it turned out, something happened in the
Middle East and I never went to Poland.
But they do that a lot. And I think they probably—you know, in that 400 that Carl
is talking about, there are probably people who were on the payroll, people who
were doing errands, and, I don’t know.
NELSON: But I must say that I really do think that the use of journalists as CIA
officers, whether they’re part-time journalists or full-time journalists, is a really
bad practice. Because I think it—I think that it certainly gives the appearance of
the corrupting of journalists, if it didn’t actually corrupt them, and…
COLBY: Oh, I think that’s…
NELSON: I’ll tell you something else, though. It does endanger—it endangers the
whole relationship of the press and government.
***
“One doesn’t want it said five years from now that the Washington Post was either asleep
or frightened if in fact the Nixon Administration is beginning a calculated campaign for controls
on freedom of the press.” That was my grandfather, quoted in a 1970 Wall Street Journal article
he clipped and kept in his personal files. The article claims the Post partially owed Geyelin for
its recent rise to the upper echelon of newspaper publishing, due to the strength of both his editorials and the Post’s editorial page on the whole, which he took over in 1968, a year after joining
the paper's staff.103 I found the clip in my aunt’s attic, in a box labeled “PERSONAL DOCS,”
alongside memorabilia from his service in the Marines in World War Two, an invitation to dinner
with President Kennedy, pictures of him and his friends circa 1950, poems and toasts, and what
looks like reporting from the trip that turned him staunchly against the Vietnam War, which he
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had already been writing about with suspicion when he first visited the troops in the midsixties.104
It’s my grandfather’s coverage of Vietnam that most deeply ensnares any narrative I
could write about his falling under (or remaining under) government influence. His writing was
pessimistic, caustic, and decidedly anti-war. I found a draft of one of his earlier stories on the war
in the same PERSONAL box in my aunt’s attic where I found his war pictures, from his two trips
on assignment for the Wall Street Journal in 1965 and 1966.105 The report is typewritten in language that looks like it’s meant to be read aloud, or telegrammed, to his editors back home, with
cross-outs and edits on thin paper. 106
soui da, south vietnam dash it was late in aye long, hot day at this special
forces encampment on the edge of war zone ccc, when all the pieces seemed to
fall into place, presenting, as in some surrealistic tableau, aye chilling vision of
how the war in vietnam could evolve, if it follows its present course, and not
much more goes wrong than might reasonably be expected from its own past history. graf
the vision was of aye never hyphen ending conflict in aye vietnam suffused and supported by aye growing uuu sss military presence; of aye Vietnam
engaged, fitfully and inconclusively,in endless quote civic action quote programs
for quote revolutionary development unquote, and shaken, periodically by recurrent domestic political crisis, fourth French republic hyphen style; of aye vietnam
increasingly dependent for its safety and survival on quote pacification unquote
efforts, whether by the big battalions in the jungles or squad hyphen sized patrols
in the hamlets, but in any case, by uuu sss troops. graf
it was only aye fleeting vision, quite possibly unprophetic, but curiously
compelling dash and not all that far removed from harsh reality. graf
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That draft, when published in the Journal, ran under the headline, “Vietnam Vision: Will
the War Ever End?”107
Besides his drafts and notes, Geyelin brought back photographs from his trip. They seem
to have been taken by a Journal photographer, because one shows Geyelin talking to a soldier,
Lieutenant David Stout, who (a colleague told Geyelin) was wounded within the next few
months and sent home to the U.S.108 Other photos he kept show U.S. troops crowded into a helicopter, sitting at the foot of a mountain, placing bodies in bags in tall grasses. A plane flies
through a cloud of smoke pluming from the struck ground below, one of a family of fires. A sequence shows a young Vietnamese man, his hands tied behind his back: first he sits next to a
truck. Then he’s blindfolded, his shirt halfway off. In the next two soldiers drag him along the
ground. In the last he lies on his side on the ground, curled into himself, eyes toward the dirt.109
Post publisher Katharine Graham hired Geyelin in 1967 as an editorialist and deputy editor of the editorial page, intending for him to shift the paper’s stance against the war he’d been
reporting on from the ground. Her decision—to hire an anti-war reporter as an editorialist for a
paper that had vigorously supported the war for the past few years—came, said Geyelin in a
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1986 interview, because “she had a sense that the paper was wrong.”110 That, and the paper
would soon need a successor for Russell Wiggins, the man then in charge of the paper’s editorial
page, who was nearing retirement.111 Wiggins supported the war, and the two men began having
near-daily ideological conflicts soon after Geyelin arrived at the Post in January of 1967.112
Geyelin advocated for a gradual shift in the paper’s position—an immediate turnaround, he said,
could damage the paper’s credibility to its readers—but by mid-1968, the paper was demanding
an end to American involvement. By that October, Geyelin was editor of the editorial page, and
the paper was publishing arguments for withdrawal strategies.113, 114
His editorial page often contained fresh reporting, and its critiques on government action
often brought criticism from those under scrutiny. Headlines from the editorial page under his
management included “Vietnam—An Unlearned Lesson,” “Vietnam: A Long Way from Peace,”
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and “Vietnam: No Happy Ending.” , , 115116117 In 1970, he won the Pulitzer on the strength of his
own editorials, which explained the paper’s turn, under his guidance, against the war.118 Publisher Katharine Graham described the Post of the late sixties and early seventies as almost completely under the control of Geyelin and his close friend, Ben Bradlee, the executive editor, a duo
described as debonair, Ivy League, elegant. Bradlee oversaw the newsroom and Geyelin oversaw
the opinions, and Graham told the Journal that the two men had almost complete freedom
—“Ben and Phil,” she said, “are just very nice about talking to me and consulting me.”119
I look at pictures of my grandfather at the time—laughing in a three-piece suit, walking
down the street with Bradlee and a briefcase, smiling at a cocktail party—and he looks more like
the administration facing national protests than he looks like my image of a protestor.120 Images
of anti-war demonstrators show Vietnam veterans throwing their war medals onto the steps of the
U.S. Capitol,121 or college-aged members of the Mayday Tribe marching through the streets of
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Washington, getting arrested in Potomac Park, chased by tear gas and overshadowed by helicopter patrols. 122 Pictures of my grandfather show him behind a desk, with coffee and a typewriter and a tie. Bradlee’s line in Geyelin’s 2004 obituary—“He was witty. He was charming. He
loved to dance. He was a figure about town.”—does not bring to mind the kind of dancing I
imagine May Day protestors doing in the Park in 1971, before more than 12,000 demonstrators
were arrested.123, 124 The next month he pushed the Post to publish the Pentagon Papers after the
New York Times was forced, by the government, to halt its own publication of the material.125
“He was the old boy of the old boys,” said Bob Woodward, the Post reporter who broke
the Watergate story with Carl Bernstein, and who remembers Geyelin from the newsroom.
Geyelin dispatched Roger Wilkins to write editorials on behalf of the series during the early days
of the investigation, when most were still regarding the reporting with suspicion. His support
meant a lot, says Woodward, to the then-cub team of journalists, “like getting condoned by the
old guard.”126 The editorials written under Geyelin’s eye—on the president’s accountability to
tell the truth, on his abuse of government powers—contributed to the Post’s 1973 Pulitzer for
public service.127
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The conspiracy theories and 1970s rumors don’t make sense, to me, when I read them
against Geyelin's own writing, or his page. My discomfort, which I seemed to share with both
some of his contemporaries and a broader, newer community of skeptics, speaks to a basic doubt
of anyone’s ability to fully separate personal and professional obligations (or competing professional obligations, if I were to presume, against his account, that the CIA was paying him). To
my modern eye, he was remarkably comfortable with the government he wrote against. But he
defended that conflation—of social, professional, formal, personal—as useful, if not natural. For
him, intimacy didn’t seem to merit insinuation.
***
In October 1977, when Geyelin appeared on On the Record to discuss Carl Bernstein’s
recent Rolling Stone exposé, the New York Times was already working on its own three-month
investigation into the CIA’s relationship with the press. They published the three-part, front-page
series, “C.I.A.: Secret Shaper Of Public Opinion” starting on Christmas Day. Unlike Seymour
Hersh’s December 1974 series, which uncovered mail openings, wiretaps, infiltrations, and other
efforts to spy on American civilians, the 1977 series explicitly focused on infiltration of foreign
media, employment of American journalists, and dissemination of propaganda abroad. My
grandfather kept Xeroxes of the full spreads in his files, along with a collection from the fresh
surge of news stories and op-eds that other people wrote in response. His margin notes and underlines and brackets serve, for me, as a key to his mental map as he charted how he would come
to articulate his own thinking on the issue.
He’s underlined the quotes he used, in the articles where they first appeared; he circled
the paragraphs that gave him pause. Through his writing and his record-keeping—here, through
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the whole project—I have learned from what he left for me to see. I’ve learned, too, that we are
similar about sentences: obsessive, he scrawls them in full and re-works them, re-chews them, in
iterations whose design I understand. I see sentences in his editorials and remember where I saw
their fragments, or palimpsests, and I’m happy to know the heritage.
But I keep thinking about what he wrote, to Califano, as he drafted the letter for Bush. “I
am always leery of the blanket denial—‘no connection’—when the files, which may or may not
see the light of day at some point, clearly record connections.” The files he left are seeing the
light of day because he left them, with easy access, for me; given that the CIA's records are still
out of my sight, my grandfather's records are all I really have. More than anything, I've read his
well-annotated account of what happened. I can write here what I think he thought, and why I
think he thought it, right now; but I’m a sketchy cartographer missing continents, and my compass keeps changing its mind.
The Times series didn’t contain a wild amount of new information, but it offered a cohesive, thorough account of the relationship between the press and the CIA over the past three
decades in an easily accessible format, drawing on Bernstein’s reporting as well as other media
and government sources of the past few years. Written for a Times-reading public home for the
holidays, the series gave numbers, and context, essentially portraying the practice of developing
"relationships" with American journalists and media organizations abroad as a product of Cold
War attitudes. The implication was that journalistic ethics—or, at least, the American approach to
them—had since changed. “Several of the journalists and CIA officials interviewed made the
point that during the height of the Cold War it was acceptable to cooperate with the agency in
ways both the CIA and the journalistic community now deem inappropriate,” read the third arti-
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cle of the series. “‘The thing to do was cooperate,’ said one retied intelligence officer. ‘I guess
that looks strange in 1977. But cooperation didn’t look strange then.’”128
The agency, it claimed, had owned or subsidized over fifty news outlets (radio stations,
newspapers, periodicals), primarily overseas, both for distributing propaganda and for providing
agents international ‘cover.’ Unlike Bernstein’s article, the Times series included the Wall Street
Journal in its list organizations that had employed American journalists simultaneously employed by the CIA. Overall, it estimated that between 30 and 100 American journalists had been
employed by the C.I.A. while working as professional reporters, a number more conservative
than Bernstein’s—but also, potentially, more damaging, as it only included those compensated
for their services. At least 12 full-time agents, claimed the article, worked as reporters or employees of American-owned news organizations.
And then there was the network of as many as 800 “propaganda assets,” primarily foreign
journalists and news outlets often told by the CIA, said William Colby, what to write or print.
This included dissemination of information the Agency wanted to reach a larger audience, but
also embellished stories, or lies. The “bogus news stories,” or “black propaganda,” were aimed
abroad, but planted with the understanding that the American media might, and occasionally did,
treat them as genuine stories. The agency described that consequence with invented terms:
“blowback,” “replay,” “domestic fallout.” In a 1967 C.I.A. directive, that fallout was labeled
“inevitable and consequently permissible.” The series emphasizes that for the most part, the in-
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tended targets were an international audience; though some agents implied that certain propaganda efforts during the Vietnam War were intended to eventually reach American eyes.129
But officers cited in the series claimed that the agency was relatively reluctant to direct
American journalists’ writing.130 For the most part, the series claimed that few of the dozens of
American journalists employed as agents overseas were used for propaganda. That was more
centralized in a “separate and far more extensive network” of media outlets and foreign journalists over which the agency exerted control, or paid for influence: “Wisner’s Wurlitzer,” designed
to play “whatever tune the CIA was in a mood to hear,” described the Times. It had two leaders:
first Tom Braden, then Cord Meyer, Jr.131 It mentions the agency’s relationship with Frederick
Praeger, the company that published my grandfather’s 1966 book on Lyndon B. Johnson.
Much of the Wurlitzer, claimed the Times, was dismantled by the time of the series’ publication. But still, I read the mentioned names, and hear how my grandfather conducted his social
life, and know about the files the CIA kept on him, and know what he did while at the agency
himself—work for Braden—and I’m sure he must have known about the operations, probably for
a long time. My grandfather was only at the CIA for eleven months; but, as he said in On the
Record, he was working in Braden’s department—in other words, publishing pro-Western propaganda, according to both the Braden article Geyelin pointed the On the Record audience to, and
the Times series. A few years later, Geyelin told Howard Bray he’d spent his eleven months
129
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bored in Washington, writing reports about Cuba.132 He told Bray he “found the work dull”; he
told Sheila Weidenfeld “he didn’t like the line of work.” Those, to me, read as different things. I
could be wrong.
It could be true that he was aware, or present, or participatory, at the creation of the propaganda program. It could also be true that he didn’t like it, quit, considered his relationship to
the agency broken, and was genuinely shocked to find, in 1976, the CIA’s record of his continued
contact with the agency. The Times series includes descriptions from former CIA station chiefs of
how local correspondents could be very useful to the agency, because of the access granted to
them as journalists. The agency, because of their own intelligence, could be useful to the journalists. These journalistic contacts weren’t considered “agents,” and they weren’t necessarily paid,
and they weren’t necessarily initiated overseas—the relationships, or friendships, could have
been formed over earlier connections, and continued because of mutual utility, or just social ties.
“Many correspondents who have spent their careers in Washington have developed close friendships with senior CIA officials,” reads the third article of the series. These men were called “assets.” In the fifties and sixties, former agency officials claimed to the Times, CIA officers were
pressured to recruit as many “assets” as possible while they were working abroad. So there were
some men listed as assets who “didn’t even know they’d been recruited,” said a former officer.
“An individual might be entirely unaware that what he viewed as a social relationship with a CIA
officer was taken far more seriously by the agency.”133 That could have been my grandfather in
1976: surprised to see that the agency thought anything of him hanging out, in Paris, London,
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Beirut, with his friends; and surprised, too, to see that anyone cared. Or he might have reviewed
his entire relationship with the Agency, it might have fit in with one of the relationships the
Times described, and he might not have found anything wrong except the descriptor of "asset"
and the allegiance it implied.
The House committee was already planning on holding late-December hearings on the
press-intelligence connection when the Times series came out.134 In the fall, following Bern stein’s article, then-Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner had already issued a directive forbidding agency members from “entering into any relationships with full-time or part-time
journalists (including so-called ‘stringers’) accredited by a U.S. news service.” But the directive
contained loopholes: freelancers weren’t included, the directive was specific to American journalists, and exceptions were permitted “with the specific approval of the DCI.” 135 It was a rule
for the CIA made by the CIA. The question posed by the Congressional hearings of December,
and that continued in the first half of the following year, asked whether something more was
necessary: whether relationships between the press and intelligence should be regulated, or restricted, by law.136 Geyelin said no.
In the immediate weeks following the Times disclosures, Geyelin published an editorial
written in the collective “we” of his editorial page. It’s not under his byline, unlike a longer,
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more personal reflection he went on to publish in May. But it’s written in his tone (I know his
syntax), and acknowledged, by one former CIA official who wrote to him in response, as
Geyelin’s personal work.137 In some ways, it’s a response to other articles recently published on
the Post’s pages. Charles B. Seib, the Post’s ombudsman, had just published an op-ed two days
earlier called “CIA and the Press: No ‘Natural Affinity,’” in which he described the CIA and the
press as two fundamentally distinct bodies. In the copy Geyelin kept, he bracketed a paragraph in
which Seib described the CIA as the conductor of “deception and covert manipulation,” doing
America’s “undercover dirty work”; the press, though, was meant to “inform the public, fully
and without bias or restraint.” “The twain,” wrote Seib, “can never meet.”138 Geyelin disagreed,
as he would fully explain in the editorial under his name five months later.
But first he wrote the shorter op-ed, speaking on behalf of the editorial page, using the
voice of their “we.” He had the authority to do that: it was his editorial page; he was part of the
paper’s old guard; he’d been with it as it rode what he called “a series of convulsions” in the late
sixties and early seventies. But his voice emerges, too, with the authority of the broader, older
generation Geyelin had come to represent. He sounds like a member of the old boys’ network
through which he had been embedded, in the fifties, in the CIA practice he’s writing about. “In
the Cold War,” he opens,
the Central Intelligence Agency enlisted the press, American and foreign, as part
of a broad, presidentially directed, congressionally endorsed campaign to combat
Communist influence around the globe. Few questions were raised. The American
press pretty much shared as well as shaped the consensus underlying national policy. It took a series of convulsions, the war in Vietnam among them, to show the
137
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American people—in a variety of ways, including the question of how to deal
with internal dissenters—that it was not desirable or even necessary to undercut
the basic institutions of their own society in order to protect the nation’s
security.139
Geyelin is able to write that few questions were raised, or that the American press “pretty
much shared as well as shaped” the governing attitude, because that was him, at the time, raising
or not raising questions. If I choose to read this with his connections to Braden, Wisner, and
Meyer in mind, then he was one of the ones sharing and shaping the policy: maybe through his
work at the CIA; maybe through his work after; or maybe through his knowledge of it, and his
choice not to object. He is part of the generation of “American people” he mentions here, who
were old enough to have their minds changed by the convulsions, and cemented enough in their
earlier psychology for national “convulsions” to be necessary. If read in that light, this paragraph
serves as an admission: he was once one of the men who thought it necessary to undercut the basic institution of his own society, in the name of his society. That changed, he’s saying; and while
he was wrong then, his mistakes were the mistakes of a generation. If viewed in the context of
his journalism--specifically on Vietnam--his mind might have been one of the earliest-changed.
His next paragraph outlines how the infiltration of foreign media, with information or
agents, can’t be condoned any more than the infiltration of domestic media. The sentiment, in a
broad scheme, speaks to a sense of immutable ethics; but elements of the passage speak, still, to
a certain sense of dependence on context. “We find it enough to observe that,” he writes, “in current conditions if not in past ones, it is intolerable for an agency of a free and open society to use

“Disentangling the CIA and the Press,” Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 8, 1978,
http://search.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/docview/146899423/pageviewPDF/1694DCDF14624B98PQ/173?accountid=15172.
139

!81
its power secretly to create a false picture in another society.” In other times, he’s saying, international propaganda was excusable--or, at least, it's less excusable now. His statements, when
read for their subtlety, contain an implication: past practices were understandable, or even condonable. They’re not condonable any longer; but, maybe, they were condonable then.
A journalist, he goes on, should never secretly serve the state as an intelligence operator.
But to have the press and the CIA formally disentangled, by law, further than the CIA has already
said it would restrain itself? He says no. “It is undignified,” he says, “and it gratuitously acknowledges dependency.” The CIA should be treated as any other news source, and the press
should be trusted to regulate itself. His tone speaks to a belief in each party’s power to self-monitor, a belief that implies each agency’s equal strength. It also implies that he believes himself uncorrupted, and incorruptible. By then end of the op-ed, he ascribes that belief to his faith in his
own journalism—a good journalist, he says, would know when he’s fed bad information, and a
good man can’t be convinced or paid to print it anyway. “No source should be able to buy or to
fool, at least for long, a good journalist. No regulation or law can save a bad one.”140
After all, he had been using the CIA, and his friends in the CIA, as sources over his entire
career. As much as the question of his conduct punctuated a national shift away from the climate
of his earlier professional years, the actual threat of regulation could or would change how he
worked. He kept one clipping from January 6, called “3 Editors Say CIA Should Stop Using Foreign Journalists,” and he underlined one quote from Gilbert Cranberg, the editorial page editor of
The Des Moines Register-Tribune. Cranberg said the CIA “should be required to quit planting
false and misleading stories abroad, not just to protect Americans from propaganda fallout, but to
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protect all readers from misinformation.” 141 Geyelin underlined everything up to “Americans”
and then wrote in the margin, “What if CIA is sometimes right when gov is wrong.” In some
ways, it’s a strange question (besides its absent punctuation). In other writing, he describes the
CIA as the government—it is, after all, the government—but in a quick, careless note, he describes it as a separate beast. How many times had he learned from the CIA what he couldn’t
learn anywhere else? How many times had that difference been relevant, to him? How many
times had the CIA been his best source? In another clipping he underlined Cranberg again. “I am
concerned… about the possibility of being an unwitting mouthpiece for CIA propaganda,” wrote
Cranberg. “I know many editorial page editors share my concern.”142 Did Geyelin? How much
did he trust who he learned from? How much of his confidence was his faith in his journalism,
and how much was his faith in his contacts?
I read his margin notes and underlines and published work as products of his background.
His conviction that a journalist can regulate himself, in relation to the government, comes from
an understanding of the two bodies as equal citizens, or as peers. It would be “undignified,” he
wrote, to think of journalists as defenseless to the advances of the government; it “gratuitously
acknowledges dependency.” That language presents the journalist as a child, or invalid, or as
otherwise vulnerable to a governmental body presented as a powerful manipulator. Geyelin saw
himself as too old, too smart, and too strong to be manipulated, and the suggestion otherwise was
at best ill-informed; at worst, insulting. Geyelin, after all, was of their cohort. He and the CIA
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had grown up together; they were childhood friends. They might have personal disagreements, or
fight, or write about each other; in the decades since they graduated college together, or fought in
the war together, or worked, their relationships had changed. But he was not inclined to see himself as needing a separate parental body to regulate his friendships; or, at least, the relationships
he had with men his own age. Journalists, he wrote, could take care of themselves.
The second-to-last paragraph of one clip he kept reads, “By using reporters as spies, the
CIA has abridged the First Amendment as effectively as any ‘law.’” He underlined up to “spies”
and drew a line to the margin, where he wrote: “And by allowing themselves to be used, what
have reporters said about the value they place on 1st Amendment rights.” He continued the
thought on the back of the facing page. “The 1st Amendment is not a grant of immunity for the
press against temptation,” he wrote. “We owe some responsibility to a system that has bestowed
upon us such sweeping protection against interference. We do not have a right under the 1st
Amendment to be saved from ourselves.”143
But what, exactly, was the temptation? Money? Access? Power? The ability to help a
friend? For a man who both denied agency “association” and admitted to having been “re-recruited,” over and over again—who turned a national paper against the Vietnam War and maintained friendships with the men who orchestrated it—I’m curious what tempted him.
***
That January op-ed was assertive, but largely left him out of it: his name didn’t appear
under the title, or explicitly within his argument. But that May, he signed his name onto a longer
editorial in the Post’s Sunday Outlook section that explained himself, as a former agent, in a per-
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sonal attack on pending legislation. The National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of
1978, which had grown out of congressional response to the December Times series, would formally regulate interactions between the press and American intelligence agencies. “It’s Up to the
Press, Not Congress, To Police CIA Ties” is two pages long, running from a corner of the Outlook front page through the entirety of the second, with two illustrations: one of a detective peering down through a magnifying glass at D.C.’s monuments; the second of a detective, with a
periscope, leaning out from where he stands inside a pen. Much of the writing is a version of the
testimony he gave earlier that month, formally opposing the broad sweep of the legislation, in
front of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: the permanent, still-standing outgrowth of
the Church Committee.
In advance of his testimony, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines had sent Geyelin a letter confirming the arrangements of his scheduled May 4th, 1978 appearance. 144 The Chairman included a copy of the legislation, pointing him to the pages that had
to do with the press.145 Geyelin marked them up in red.
“Starts here,” he wrote, at section 132. He underlined (a): “No entity of the intelligence
community may—” and then drew a line to section 3: “pay or provide other valuable consideration to any individual to engage in any intelligence activity for or on behalf of the United States
or provide any intelligence information to any department or agency if such individual—”. The
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rest he bracketed. Next to the following passage, he wrote “NO,” meaning it had no place in legislation.
(A) is a journalist146 accredited to any United States media organization,
(B) is not an openly acknowledged officer, employee, or contractor of any entity
of the intelligence community and regularly contributes material relating to
politics, economics, international affairs, military, or scientific matters to any
United States media organization,
(C) is regularly involved in the editing of material for any United States media
organization, or
(D) acts to set policy for, or provide direction to any United States media organization;
The passing of a bill including that passage would have formally banned information exchanges between the intelligence community and the media. My grandfather’s margin question—“What if CIA is sometimes right when gov is wrong”—would have become irrelevant. His
old lunches and dinners and drinks with friends in the CIA would no longer be legal, if either
gave or took “any intelligence information.”
The testimony he gave on May 4th, in which he urged the Committee to reconsider, reads
as a prelude of the editorial he published later that month—the only piece of writing he attached
his name to at the Post in all of 1978. It’s personal, and it’s very public, in some ways more public than his congressional testimony: just as the front-page Times series that December was probably more widely read, or at least made more easily accessible, than the hundred of pages of the
Church report, Geyelin’s front-page Outlook editorial in the Sunday Post was probably a more
public, and more vulnerable, form of public argument. It’s in his medium, in his paper. In some
ways, it reads as a confession, and a personal justification; and it’s also presented as a dissent
from the opinions of many newsmen. Reading it when I did—after finding the letters and memos
146 All
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regarding the CIA trip; after seeing what he’d said on television, and told historians—felt like
reading a narrative I’d put together run through a round of his own edits.
The editorial—personal essay, really—starts with an italicized epithet. “‘Congress shall
make no law… to abridge the freedom of the press.’ –from the First Amendment to the Constitution” sits above his opening, which introduces the Senate Intelligence Subcommittee’s efforts, at
the time, to make a law he summarizedsas an attempt “to abridge the CIA, so to speak, from interfering, one way or another, with the free flow of news.” He calls the effort admirable, given
what had become public in the past years, and understandable, given the “strong case” other media members had made about a “hyperactive and insensitive CIA” needing to be regulated by
bodies outside of the CIA itself. “But,” he continues, in the last paragraph of the first page, “I am
troubled by the idea of trying to manage anything as complex, subtle and diverse as the relations
between the press and a clandestine intelligence service by passing laws.” The law could actually
curtail, he argues, the press's freedom.
The next page opens with a disclosure. “My doubts,” he says, “derive not only from some
years as a newspaper reporter and editor but also from a brief encounter—or, rather, a series of
spasmodic encounters—with the CIA.” He says he worked for the CIA in Washington, in 1951,
on a leave of absence from the Journal; and that later, as a foreign correspondent and Washington diplomatic reporter for the Journal, he “frequently had the sort of contacts with CIA officials
that news people have with any other sources.” Recently, he says, he “requested the opportunity”
to find out whatever the CIA had on file under his name. The examples he gives allude to what I
didn’t get to see, or hear read aloud: while I have Califano’s bulleted summaries, one-to-two sentences to item, it seems that the two men had heard long memos, and cables in their full lan-
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guage. Geyelin's essay doesn't introduce entries I’d never heard of, but it alludes to their extension past what I've seen—either in Califano's memos, or in this longer article. What Geyelin does
choose to include, he edited, and phrased, to read gently.
“What I found, among other things,” he writes (to which I want to ask, of course, What
other things?),
were cables to Washington from unidentified overseas CIA operatives abroad, citing my earlier CIA employment and advancing various proposals to create some
sort of ‘agent’ relationship with me while I was working abroad—proposals never
acted upon or presented to me in any serious way. Also recorded were reports of
my end of the conversation in interviews and briefings that even then would have
struck me as being of astonishing insignificance, but apparently constituted ‘intelligence’ to the CIA at the time.
As examples, he includes a “report of a conversation I dimly remember having with a
long-time friend, who happened to work for the CIA,” in which he mentioned the then-prime
minister of France having recently been impressed at a meeting with Eisenhower; a CIA memo
given to the Pike Committee claiming he had given two ‘economic reports’ to the agency after
visiting Cuba in 1964 (“these,” he follows, “turned out to be two observations, each one sentence
long, that I had made verbally to a Washington-based CIA intelligence analyst for the simple
purpose of soliciting reaction”); a reference to him as a “willing collaborator,” which turned out
to be “the CIA’s quaint way of describing ‘anybody who would knowingly talk to a CIA
official,’”; and a “judgment that my weak grasp of the French language made it doubtful that I
could be of much use to the agency in Paris—at the least, an unkind cut, if not actually a
canard.”
This is an edited version of the list I’ve read, and included, from Califano’s memo. But to
my reading, it does contain the most potentially damning instances Califano noted, if it excludes

!88
certain language—“agreed to help,” for example, or “definitely interested and willing.” That,
though, could be Geyelin’s choice for concision, or clarity. He was, after all, an editor. My instinct is to understand his early admission as an author’s establishment of authority, with the
reader, and transparency. It could also be the choice of a man tired of rumors, and the best way to
control them was to write them himself.
It’s an interesting preface to his following section, which he begins with his first conclusion: that there would be “no very useful purpose” in the CIA granting full access, or publicly
unveiling, all of their past records relating to their dealings with the media. “Having compared
experiences with a number of colleagues, my guess is that the files on most foreign correspondents of long experience would invite as much misinterpretation—and uncomprehension—as my
own.” Maybe fair. But it’s a striking follow-up to a passage in which he, if it’s honest, made himself transparent within his own terms. Maybe he really just doesn’t want to create similar ordeals
for reporters who didn’t pursue meetings at the agency themselves (or who didn’t have the connections, or familiarity, or favors to pull, to get a letter from the DCI stating their stainlessness
for the public record). Maybe, with a less generous reading, he wasn’t warm to the idea of his
exposing his record bare, without the trim of his prose.
And his next argument, too, is strange given his status as an editorial page editor –-“editorial page editors like to deal in pure principles,” he’d told the Senate committee earlier the
same month. But the editorial briefly presents the question of interaction as an argument in relativism. As to whether the CIA-press relationship should be regulated by law, he argued, “the answer, it seems, to me, has something to do with how important—and distinctive—you think the
CIA/press problem is in relation to all the other CIA excesses and abuses” recently brought be-
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fore Congress. He lists assassination, subversion, coups, unacknowledged organizational “cover”
in activist groups. “One could argue,” he argued, “that the question of what sort of dealings the
CIA ought to have with the press is not a very big deal.” It’s only “a page or two” of the whole
bill, he says, and not particularly different from questions about “cover” as they relate to other
organizations and figures—students, priests, academics. The answer to those questions could be
applied to the journalists—except, he says, for the press’s own constitutional protections. The
First Amendment, he argues, rightfully sets the press apart.
But he understands, he says, why so many people seem to want the legislation. The recent
numbers of media members who allegedly had past CIA connections—whatever reported numbers you believe—don’t matter, in their quantity; if it’s thought that any American news people
are tied to a government agency, they’re all implicated in doubt. But third-party regulation, he
argues, would be at best fruitless, and at worst prohibitive. The bulk of the rest of his rhetoric
offers his proposed alternative: a restoration of trust in the press’s ability to govern itself. Reading it, I’m caught off-guard by his extended metaphor. “It is worth remembering,” he writes,
“that in the relationship between the CIA and the press, we are not dealing with the journalistic
equivalent of rape. We are dealing with transactions between consenting adults.”
The comparison implies a shift, over the past years, to an understanding of the CIA as a
powerful, manipulative body with the ability to coerce a vulnerable press—a slightly different
argument, as I read it, than one in which the press needs to guard against its own temptations. In
his metaphor, he refutes that new cultural premise: that even if the CIA were cloudy, subversive,
and malicious, it’s not strong enough to force the media into compliance. He’s recasting the
frame, creating one within which the journalists have the power to be equally immoral. His fol-
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lowing argument hinges on the faith that they won’t be, which hinges on his assertion that—
however you frame his earlier relationship to the CIA—he hadn’t been.
His argument relies on the assumption that he, and all journalists, possess strength of a
similar magnitude as that of the agency facing policing (because the legislation, to be clear,
posed the agency as the actor, not the press). His self-image makes sense: given his past relationship to the CIA, and the men in it, he would understand himself as having experienced power (at
least over himself) similar in magnitude, if not always operation, to that of the bodies facing legal restrictions. He might have been re-recruited, but he had the self-possession to refuse.
But his next sentences seem to attempt to excuse, or at least contextualize, earlier years in
which he might have deployed that equal power for purposes some might misjudge, when looking back from 1978. In underscoring the concept of the press and the government as “consenting
adults,” in the present moment, he provides a parallel to the decades prior, in which both agencies hadn’t yet grown into themselves (and, by that logic, shouldn’t be judged too harshly now
for the earlier phases of their thinking). The maturation into “consenting adults” only followed
the immaturity of earlier ages. “We are not dealing,” he wrote,
with the CIA of, let us say, 20, or 10, or even five years ago—the CIA as it is pictured in congressional intelligence committee reports and the memoirs of disaffected former agents: beyond effective control and oversight, caught up in a Cold
War psychology, run by an old boy net of driven men, insulated from public sensibilities.
That was his CIA, and him—twenty years ago; now disaffected; having gotten over their
early-Cold War paranoia. While he doesn’t include himself in the sentence, his earlier admissions
place him within the frame: he, too, had grown up within a nation that came of age over a decade
of mistrust. The press, in my reading, has aged into suspicion; it has also aged into responsibility.
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Though they had always possessed the capacity to police themselves against government advances, they might not have always known that they should. Now, the press knew better: they
should be wise enough to know they’re not partners, and that cooperation would be read as a
partnership in crime. His next sub-section is titled “Good Reporters Resist.”
The CIA, he argues, is a piece of a larger intelligence network strung throughout the government. A law relating to conflicts of interest between the press and intelligence would not be
very different, in nature, from conflicts regarding the press and the rest of the government. “The
point,” he says, “is that newspaper organizations and those who work for them under the special
protection of the First Amendment ought to have no working relationships of any kind with any
part of the government that are not openly acknowledged as a part of the business of professional
journalism.” Not for pay; not out of “some misguided sense of patriotism.” That phrase reads
like a counter to Helms’s letter, or the confusion of Bross, over what they said they would have
considered “patriotic” acts of Geyelin’s in the early fifties, had the allegations been true. The allegiance they alluded to—to a government fighting a Cold War, alongside its civilians, maybe in
partnership with its journalists—is not an allegiance Geyelin would publicly condone in 1978.
He mentions a Post article he’d clipped from that January, where former CIA official Ray S.
Cline claimed the CIA and the press had a “natural affinity”—both agencies were “searching for
nuggets of truth about the outside world.” While Geyelin agreed with that description, he rejected the term “affinity”: the press and the CIA, he argued, should have the same “natural adversary” relationship as the press has with any institution.
But as to whether the CIA should be prohibited, by law, from seeking out a relationship?
“Surely when news organizations are compromised,” he wrote,
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there has to be some element of willingness on somebody’s part to be compromised. And if this is so, it would seem to me to follow that when the press asks for
legislation to protect itself from exploitation in one way or another by the CIA,
what it is asking, really, is for the government to save it from itself.
They’re all, according to his argument, past the time of cooperation. The assumption is
that, at this point, the press would not choose to collude with the government: a call to patriotism
would be misguided; a call to money would be corrupt. He calls the proposed, protective legislation a “favor”—as in, “not a favor that the press should be asking of the government—along with
just about any other conceivable favor.”
But it’s a strange line. If the press is, by this point, so morally mature that it would choose
not to corruptly collaborate with the government, why would a Congressional safeguard protecting against its own decision-making be a “favor”? Most of his rhetoric flows from a high moral
ground; but it poses the legislation as a defense against what he seems to argue would be a nonproblem, if the press and the government do actually have the equal degrees of empowerment
that he argues they do. His argument seems to define the problem as moot: journalists are strong
enough and smart enough to protect themselves, so the proposed legislation would just be reinforcing an self-enforced defense.
But if the legislation were only an unnecessary adornment to a solved problem, he
wouldn’t be taking so hard a line, testifying to both the Senate committee and his readership
within the same month. Rather, his argument is a moral justification for what he really wants: the
continued legality of the way he knows how to conduct his career, and his own dealings with the
government. Legislation de-legalizing the exchange of information between the CIA and the
press would outlaw the way he knows how to work.
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When the Senate sub-committee sent him a letter confirming the date and time of his testimony, and a draft of the proposed bill, they included a set of questions meant to guide their discussion. Geyelin presents a few in his essay: Should journalists be permitted to swap information
with the CIA? Should they be permitted to get briefings before visiting a particularly foreign
area? Should they be permitted to report voluntarily information they derive from such visits?
His response, first, is “Permitted by whom?” Journalism, he argued both to the committee and in
his Post piece, is not a game of Go Fish, where you ask your source to give over all its aces—it
involves presenting information, often for comment and response. The journalist is doing his job,
looking for answers; but the questions convey something to the intelligence source, too (his arguments exclude the mention of journalist-provided information beyond those written into a
question). Statutory regulation can’t, or shouldn’t, forbid them, he argues; and while news organizations might have the power to do so, it wouldn’t be in their interest. It’s normal news gathering, what he’s been doing for decades, and only recently has anyone been asking questions about
it.
The place for law-making, he says, is wherever the press has no control: if news agencies
don’t know that the CIA has placed one of its agents under journalistic cover; if the CIA is
covertly pumping propaganda into the U.S. system. As to the use of foreign newsmen, he is less
definitive, though he thinks there’s “a good case” that the CIA shouldn’t treat foreigners any differently than American news organizations and news people, if “American values are to have any
meaning.” And as to blowback into American news from CIA propaganda abroad? That, he says,
would be difficult to enforce against; and, anyway, good American reporting should prohibit the
publication of bad material—in other words, that falls under journalistic jurisdiction. That’s the
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definition of where regulation should stop: whenever matters are subject to the American press’s
control, or consent. Because, he finishes,
At best, what we are talking about most of the time, in connection with past abuses, excesses and conflicts of interest in the relationship between the press and the
CIA, is seduction. A better way to put it might be prostitution. But if that’s what
we’re talking about, it seems to me that we in the press are obliged to remember
who it is, in these transactions, that is playing the part of the prostitute.
I will set aside our potentially conflicting understandings of the level of consent involved
in prostitution, and focus on what I think, here, he’s trying to do: demonstrate the depth of moral
culpability to which he would hold a journalist who accepts payment, or succumbs to the temptation of power, when acting as a CIA mouthpiece. This, he is arguing, never is, or never was, him.
The article, on the whole, places him both inside and outside of the problem he’s writing on: I
was in the CIA, it says, but only for a little; many journalists have been coerced, but I wasn’t one
of them; the CIA is tempting, but I was able to resist. I was there, and I wasn’t. Don’t worry
about it.
But, again, he ends on strange language, given the whitewashed history with which he
paints himself. What, exactly, was so tempting? Did he mean only money?147
***
In October my uncle came to visit me. He’d just been in Maine, at the summer house my
grandparents built on Mount Desert Island. It was passed down to my dad’s generation, and now
my aunt and uncle, the ones I had visited in Virginia, spend the most time there. My uncle and
cousin had just finished repainting. He showed me pictures of the awning he’d re-roofed, over
Philip L. Geyelin, “It’s Up to the Press, Not Congress, To Police CIA Ties,” Washington Post
(Washington, D.C.), May 21, 1978, http://search.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost/docview/
146840049/B6D99A5AEFFA4194PQ/1?accountid=15172.
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the front door, and then he asked me if I’d ever been in the “sub-basement crawl space.” I said
no.
He said he’d been down there, looking for tools or something, and he found this pile of
boxes. He didn’t even touch them, he said, because he knew I’d be all over them—they looked
like papers, with labels in my grandfather’s hand. One of them just said, “Kissinger.” I should go
there, if I had time.
My friend and I drove up the last weekend of winter break. It was snowing, and she’s
from California, so I was glad to have snow tires. It took a long time. There was one restaurant
open in town—the winter is the off-season—and its windows were the only ones lit up as we
drove in, past dark. I remembered my grandparents’ driveway from when I was younger. It’s
long, and winds through pine trees on either side. No one had plowed it, so we moved the Prius
as far off the road as possible and walked, tired and falling, in between white-hung evergreens
whose weighted-down branches seemed to pull them, leaning, towards us. The snow was so
thick the air felt soundproofed, but it might have just been that there wasn’t anyone else close
nearby.
In the morning I woke up and went to find the key behind the garage. My grandparents
had built two houses: one for them to sleep in, and one for their kids, or kids and grandkids.
There’s a man, Ken, who lives in Maine and periodically checks on the houses over the winter,
and he’d left the key to the second house under the doormat, which we’d dug out the night before. But I thought the basement my uncle had mentioned was somewhere in the house my
grandparents used to sleep in, and Ken had said the key to that one was tucked into a wooden
beam under the roof’s overhang out back. I found it with my fingers.
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My grandparents’ house felt, inside, like a museum. All the curtains had been closed for
the winter, and furniture piled in the middle of the main room. The air looked like dust and it was
freezing, obviously. I didn’t really know what I was looking for, or how to find a sub-basement
crawl space, so I spent the morning opening closets and looking for small doors. There was one I
liked—it was half my height and blended into the wood paneling, and above it was a wooden
sign (“ATTENTION: CHAT LUNATIQUE!”) that made me think of my grandmother. But inside
was just old mousetraps and rat poison and heating insulation, and the sort of dust I felt like I
shouldn’t touch.
So I went back to the house we’d slept in, thinking maybe I was wrong. And under the
stairs I noticed the outline of a door I hadn’t noticed, in the same pattern of wooden planks as the
rest of the floor. Underneath was an unlit basement shorter than I am. There were piles of old
lawn furniture and boxes of upholstery fabric I recognized from my grandmother’s chairs, a
weird bag of hair, or fake hair, crates of old records, and boxes and boxes of old clippings and
folders and letters, in a pile towards the back. For the next day I carried them up and down the
short ladder of stairs, putting down folders on the floor of the living room and looking through
them as quickly as I could. It made me laugh to see that they’d kept some files in old cardboard
boxes for André, the cheap champagne people still buy for college parties, the twin of a box I’d
been using for my own files, back at school.
I didn’t have much time, so I took what I thought could be useful and put it in a cardboard box to carry back up the driveway and bring home. I’ve been keeping it in my bedroom.
The papers in it are mostly yellowed, and smell like basement wet. I looked through them again
the other day, and pulled out one of the folders I took in full: “CUBA-1964.”
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As far as I can tell, it’s from the trip that came up in his 201 file at the CIA—the one
where, afterward, he’d allegedly met with CIA contacts, and then provided them with reports
(reports he denied having written, and which the agency later conceded he hadn’t). I don’t know,
from the folders alone, whether he did or didn’t write them. But I remembered how one of the
first things Califano brought up, on the phone in December, was accusations about “Cuba or
something”; and I remembered Califano’s 1976 memo, in which he wrote that Geyelin, looking
at his 201 file, was surprised to see it written that he “knew anything about the Cuban budget” in
1964. In the folder were two papers that I’m glad I looked at again during a week when I was so
focused on his May 1978 editorial.
They’re both typewritten. The first is titled “ray kline:”. I hadn’t known who that was,
and I still don’t. But I’m inclined to believe it’s a misspelling of Ray S. Cline, who my grandfather quoted in his May editorial, and who had been the head of the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, or analytical branch, during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.148 From the notes, he and
Geyelin talked about the Soviets’ ability to control “sam sites,” or surface-to-air missile sites;
Castro, prices on sugar crops; western trade. 149
The second is just titled “des:”. It, too, is in the format of notes written after a meeting. I
want to say it’s Desmond FitzGerald, which would make sense—he was the head CIA officer in
charge of Cuba following the missile crisis, and he was based in Washington in 1964. Originally,
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he’d been hired by Frank Wisner near the start of the Korean War.150 In Stuart Loory’s Review
article, FitzGerald is mentioned as one of a handful of former Deputy Directors of Plans, those in
charge of approving the hiring or retention of American newsmen, along with Wisner and
Helms.151 In Carl Bernstein’s article, FitzGerald was the CIA agent who urged Joe Alsop, my
grandfather’s journalist friend, to go to the Philippines and report on the election. William Colby
calls him “Des” when he references him on On the Record.152
Obviously, I don’t know for sure. All it says is “des,” and a lot of language whose tone
doesn’t sound like what I’m used to reading from my grandfather—it’s uglier, and sounds like
the language of someone making plans, not reporting on them. They read, to me, as notes from
someone else’s words. (An example: “if you could glass it off and keep castro’s influence away
from rest of hemisphere, if you could forget about guat. and hon. and rest of Caribbean and
brizola and the rest, and have cuba like an ant colony, i’d like to keep it forever. a showplace for
us.” Or, at the bottom of the page: “fidel is everything, subtract him and a three way dog-fight.
the undigested lump, the old communists, the 26th of july, which ran wide gamut, to the rich and
the reasonable, to socialists, but not to communists, many not there; also the army which largely
26th of july. if bloodshed, oas [Organization of American States] would have to move in. hope to
set stage for that.”) Near the top of the page is a three word sentence—“the alice principle.”—
that Geyelin underlined.
Towards the middle of the page is a paragraph that caught my attention.

150

Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 239-240.

151

Loory, “The CIA’s use of the press: a ‘mighty Wurlitzer,’” 14.

152

See Appendix M.

!99
story idea: grab almost any economic string and follow it – a factory or whatever.
Ask what price of sugar, dockside, manufacturing price. An interesting price,
whatever they say, price per pound. Ask number of employes (sic), market, where
get raw materials, what pay, etc. this would show gross inefficiency, even though
some of the figures are meaningless.
Was this Geyelin’s story idea? Or Des’s? To me, this doesn’t read like my grandfather’s
language. It would make more sense to me that Des, of the CIA, would be motivated to demonstrate communist inefficiency in Cuba, even if through “meaningless” figures. I don’t know, but
it matters. Because if Geyelin wrote a story because a CIA official suggested so, and if it contained meaningless figures that showed what the CIA wanted, isn’t that CIA-directed propaganda?
There’s no date on the paper. It’s in a file titled “CUBA-1964” and seems consistent with
that: it mentions the Barry Goldwater campaign, and recent high sugar prices. It seems to have
come around or after July 26, because there’s mention of “the eder bit,” ostensibly the article
Richard Eder wrote on Fidel Castro for the Times, published on July 26, 1964.153 “des,” however,
could have easily known about the interview between Eder and Castro before the article was
published, given his station as an intelligence officer focused on Cuba—my grandfather knew, at
least, judging from a sentence in an article he published on July 27.154

153

Richard Eder, “Cuba Lives by Castro’s Moods,” New York Times (New York: NY), July 26,
1964, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1372214-cuba-lives-by-castros-moods.html.
Judging from an article published by Geyelin on July 27, “Fidel’s Message: All’s Well in
Cuba Yet He’d Like U.S. Reconciliation,” Eber’s interview was common knowledge—he mentions “a carefully calculated interview with a U.S. correspondent” that had happened a few
weeks prior to the publication date. (Philip L. Geyelin, “Castro Calling: Fidel’s Message: All’s
Well in Cuba Yet He’d Like U.S. Reconciliation,” Wall Street Journal (New York: NY), July 27,
1964, http://search.proquest.com/hnpwallstreetjournal/docview/132941243/4641B76DFB1A4C38PQ/1?accountid=15172.)
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That August and September, Geyelin published a four-part series in the Wall Street Journal on the current state of Cuba. I’m inclined to read his “des” notes as having been taken in a
pre-departure meeting, where Geyelin could have been trying to get a sense of the country he
was about to report on. Over the span of a few weeks, he participated in a Cuban government-led
guided tour for about thirty-six American journalists touring the country on a trip authorized by
the U.S. State Department. From the article, it seems that the trip (from the Cuban perspective)
was meant to give a positive impression of the country under Castro’s communism. Judging from
Geyelin’s series, they didn’t succeed.
The first three installments ran on the Journal’s front page, starting at the top of the leftmost or right-most column; the last part ran on page 8. The first was written from Santiago, and
the next three from Havana. I found pictures from the trip in the Library of Congress, taken by a
documentarian, Robert Cohen, who was working on a film project called “Inside Castro’s Cuba.”
The photos are black and white, of shirtless and white-undershirt-wearing laborers in a steel mill.
A man in a woven hat holds machinery that looks, on quick glance, like a long rifle, his gaze serious and focused somewhere out of the camera’s sight. An older man in a wide-brimmed hat sits
in front of a chained-off, crumbling brick wall, resting an actual rifle across his lap. One shows
my grandfather in a short-sleeved pin-striped button-down, holding a clipboard and a pen, hand
on hip while he watches a steel worker handle black metal chain dangling from the ceiling. 155
For front-page news articles, they're more editorialized than I would expect. Most of the
first is relatively temperate, and serves to set up the rest of the series: my grandfather was there

Photographs by Richard Cohen, 1964, in the Philip L. Geyelin Papers at the Library of Con gress, Box 27, Folder 11.
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because Castro wanted to present a positive image of his country amidst American consternation,
as a ploy to improve relations with the U.S. and maneuver himself out of the political and economic struggles facing the relatively new regime. The country was facing the consequences of a
few years of poor sugar crops, a major export, and was almost completely dependent on trade
with the Soviet bloc following the U.S. embargo. Farm output and industrial production had
“sagged,” and a week before the article’s publication, the Organization of American States had
imposed further trade restrictions. 156
The second article is less restrained. “After five-and-a-half years of Fidel Castro,” reads
the first line, “Cuba is, by almost any standards, an economic mess, an ideological mish-mash, a
misfit and a menace in the Western Hemisphere. It is also, of course, a ruthlessly-run police state,
and a Soviet satellite.” “A visitor,” wrote Geyelin, “has no difficulty spotting evidence of decay
and dissidence.” He commented on the ascension of “New Cubans” from “lowly status” to toplevel executive positions, which were either created by the regime or left vacant by formerly
middle-class professionals who had fled into exile or been imprisoned as counter-revolutionaries.
“Untutored, and by any reasonable measurement unqualified for their jobs,” he wrote, “the ‘New
Cubans’ must, in one sense, be counted a liability; in generous measure, they contribute to the
gross mismanagement and inefficiency that has wreaked such havoc on Cuba’s potentially rich
economy.” He deemed the government-sponsored education of students at Cuban universities
“brainwashing,” and predicted that possible future miscalculations by Fidel and his “amateur
Marxist economists” would mean “the economy could conceivably collapse.” (As, he wrote,
“Some experts, including a good many U.S. officials, have high hopes this will happen, given

156

Philip Geyelin. “Castro Calling.”

!102
time.”) On the whole, the loyalty of the upwardly-mobile Fidelistas is presented as a temporary
product of probably-doomed—or at least deplorable—policies.
While the tone was inflammatory, it could have just been a reflection of what the visiting
journalists were observing. Emotional prose might have been more familiar in the context of the
early-sixties Cold War than it is now, in terms of front page journalism. The third article is more
challenging: Geyelin seemed to take “des” up on his story idea, and pretty explicitly. Follow almost any economic string, “des” had told him—a factory, or whatever—and find the price. It
would show inefficiency, even if the figures don’t matter. “The alice principle.”
Geyelin went to the “Socialist Vanguard Factory,” what he calls “a dingy, cluttered steel
mill” just outside Havana. It manufactured spare replacement parts for the rest of the Cuban industries—a necessary function, given that during the early period of Castro’s regime, “probably
90%” of Cuban factory and plant equipment was made in America. Since then, “aid from the Red
bloc” had reduced that number to 70%; but still, the majority of Cuba’s sugar, nickel, cotton textile, cigar, bottling, and other plants, as well as oil refineries and the railroad, were dependent on
American-made manufacturing. Since the U.S. had halted all exports to Cuba, the Cuban government had had to build a new plant focused on replacing the spare parts they could no longer
import. For illustration, Geyelin includes some figures, which were potentially irrelevant by
des’s metric. “At the H. Uppman cigar factory, for example, some 60% of production, now totaling 98,000 cigars a day, is done by 17 machines made by International Cigar Machinery of New
Jersey.” Machinery breakdowns will keep the factory from fulfilling its projected “norms” for the
year. The factory manager, he wrote, said there were enough spare parts orders to operate 24
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hours a day; but the lack of skilled workers mean the factory was “functioning well below full
capacity.” The next subsection he titled, “The Alice Principle.”
“To a good many students of current Cuban economics,” he wrote, “the boom in the
Cuban spare parts business is graphic evidence of what one authority calls ‘the Alice principle—
the need for Cuba to run at a feverish rate simply to stay in the same place.’ The spare parts factory—in which Cuban labor energy and expertise was focused, essentially, on hand-making replacement parts—was “a shining example of economic inefficiency.” He went on to other examples: the British buses made of Iron Curtain products unsuited for Havana’s humidity, giving
them a life expectancy of a year and a half. Oil refineries dependent on Soviet petroleum, which
traveled five times longer by sea than oil that could have been purchased within Cuba’s hemisphere (read: the U.S.), potentially explaining the recent doubling of Cuban gas prices. Government insurances preventing the firing of workers, resulting in frequent over-employment of
workers for any particular job. “Socialist doctrine,” wrote Geyelin, “firmly fixed, contributes
mightily to economic waste, as does the impulsive, or simply incompetent, policy-making of Mr.
Castro and his crew.” The passage ends with “one high government official who obviously has
yet to be fully converted to communism”: “Anything that smacks of capitalism is immediately
equated with corruption,” he’s quoted as saying. “‘And yet,’ he adds ruefully, ‘I have yet to discover a better test of efficiency than money.’” In the next passage, Geyelin applied the Alice
principle to sugar prices.
So what? I don’t know, for sure. I don’t even know that the story idea came from
Desmond FitzGerald, though I find it likely—partially because the notes seem to have been filed
just a few pages away from another top CIA expert, Ray S. Cline (pending that that’s who my
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grandfather meant by “ray kline”). Partially because Geyelin references him in reference to the
Alice principle (“one authority”), and FitzGerald would certainly be considered an authority, and
certainly be motivated to portray the communist economy as fantastically self-limiting. And partially because Califano’s memos state that Geyelin met with CIA personnel stationed in Washington in September and October 1964, following his return from Cuba, visits that would make even
more sense if he had a prior relationship with FitzGerald and Cline. A pre-trip meeting might not
have been recorded in the CIA file because Geyelin was looking to them for background information, rather than giving them information after his trip. Or it could have been there, and Califano might not have noted the meeting in his memo.
So assume I’m right, and “des” was Desmond. Then what?
It’s possible that this would be one of the “contacts” my grandfather would have described as “normal,” or nothing. And maybe it’s really nothing. The articles, after all, weren’t
entirely in the tone of anti-Communist propaganda—there were a few references in some of the
articles to Castro’s regime’s ability to improvise moments of ingenuity, or creatively maneuver
the obstacles of their system. “It is not quite safe to conclude,” reads the third line of the third
article, “that it is doomed to collapse, or even that it may not stagger through its trials and errors
to greater strength.” The CIA official could have provided a story idea that both demonstrated an
objective truth—the regime’s economic inefficiency—and happened to support a pro-capitalist,
pro-Western agenda. The fact that the thesis of the series follows the U.S. government’s party
line—endorsing the power, and superiority, of an American capitalist system—does not necessarily mean that it’s an incorrect thesis, or that my grandfather wouldn’t have written along its lines
anyway.
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But it toes a line, if it doesn't cross it.. My grandfather meets with Cuba-focused CIA officials before he goes on a journalistic trip to the country. I don’t know who initiated the meeting.
The CIA has information, and a pro-America, Cuba-hostile agenda. They give him a “story
idea”—either he gets the idea himself while talking to the CIA, or the CIA says, “Here’s a story
idea”—that would demonstrate the economic inefficiency of Castro’s regime. Geyelin goes
where they say to—a factory—and finds information to meet the idea, including figures, though
he’s told by the CIA that “some of the figures are meaningless.” He ends up fitting his reporting
within the framework presented by the meeting, which seems to have taken place before Geyelin
left for Cuba. Or, the material he finds matches the ideas of the CIA, because their information is
accurate, as well as to their advantage. His reporting might have fit naturally with the CIA’s idea;
he might have worked to work it in. It might not have been work at all—he could have been on
the same page as the CIA; the story that worked to their advantage could have been the story that
was there.
The anecdote parallels the story with which Carl Bernstein led his 1977 exposé, which
was meant to be damning enough to draw readers into a scandalized history. Joe Alsop, it reads,
went to the Philippines to cover an election. “He went,” reads the final line of the introduction,
“at the request of the CIA.” The statement is meant to be obviously outrageous enough to stand
on its own. But later in the article, Alsop admits to it, casually—“Des FitzGerald urged me to
go,” he says—while simultaneously insisting the Agency didn’t manipulate him. “What I wrote
was true,” he said. “My view was to get the facts. If someone in the Agency was wrong, I
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stopped talking to them.” The key, he said, was keeping yourself clear. “You can’t get entangled
so they have leverage on you,” he said. 157
So Geyelin might have gone because Des urged him to; he might just have met with him
before he left. The CIA might have given him a story idea, and that idea might have served their
interests; it might also have been a good idea, from any source. Geyelin might have written a story that served their agenda, or Geyelin might have had the same agenda they did. The information he found might have cooperated with their agenda without any intentional coercion, or
wordplay. Where, in there, did he draw his ethical fault line? Did he think he was toeing it?
Would his answer have changed between 1964 and 1978? What about the rest of the country’s?
And what about another line of Alsop’s, from the Bernstein article: “The analytical side
of the Agency had been dead wrong about the war in Vietnam—they thought it couldn’t be won,”
he said (apparently admitting a belief that the war was lost to misstep, rather than inevitable failure).158 “What if CIA is sometimes right when gov is wrong,” my grandfather wrote in a 1977
margin. What if the government and my grandfather were getting the same intelligence, but reporting it differently? And what if his anti-Vietnam editorializing grew from that CIA-sourced
information, which the proposed 1978 legislation would have barred him from obtaining?

***
I found another letter in my aunt and uncle’s attic last summer. My grandfather kept a
copy of it in another box labeled “Personal files.” I don’t know why. It’s dated November 18,
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2002, about fourteen months before he died. It’s addressed to Joe Califano. My understanding is
that it was for Califano’s memoir.
Joe—This is a copy of George the First’s letter to me. I can’t find, and doubt I
ever had a copy of the letter you crafted from me to him. I remember that I wanted something a bit more precise about the entirely professional reporter/source
contacts I had with CIA people after leaving the agency—some of them unwittingly with covert operatives.
I also remember that Bush was pretty starchy about the whole thing, arguing that
if he wrote such a letter for me it would set a bad precedent and he might wind up
having to write one for ‘hundreds’ of correspondents who had similarly innocent
encounters with Agency people.
I also recall that the material was pretty voluminous; that they had assigned me a
code name and that the ‘reports’ to headquarters made no mention of the questions
I was acting (sic) or of the questions that the CIA guys asked me, so that it appeared I was an “informant” volunteering “intelligence.”
I have recollections, still vivid, of how it all began with Bill Colby handling over
(sic) tons of raw files to the Church and Pike committees, of the leaks from the
thoroughly undisciplined staff of the Pike Committee, and the story in a Chicago
newspaper that lead me (sic) to seek some sort of explanation from people I had
known in the Agency, winding up with a letter from Dick Helms who argued that
if I hadn’t collaborated with the CIA, I should have as a matter of patriotic duty.
Please don’t ask me to look for that correspondence. The only letter I cared about
was the one from Bush. If you’ll come to Washington and join me for lunch I’ll
take you to the Cosmos Club where I’d have to pay. It would be good for your
image.
Best to Hillary
As ever,
(his signature)159
At this point he was almost eighty. I’ll use that to explain his typos, and his slips. Loory’s
article didn’t appear in a Chicago paper, though he did write for the Chicago Sun-Times; I’ll
choose to understand “acting” as an easy mix-up for “asking,” and not some telling Freudian

Letter to Joseph A. Califano, Jr., from Philip L. Geyelin, November 18, 2002, in the personal
archives of Mary Sherman Willis, in a box labeled “P.L.G. Personal files.”
159
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slip. I’m going to understand his tone of explanation (“I wanted something a bit more precise
about the entirely professional reporter/source contacts I had with CIA people after leaving the
agency—some of them unwittingly with covert operatives”) as a factor of his remembering out
loud, to a friend writing a memoir, and not some eerie example of him knowing what I, his
granddaughter, was looking to figure out, sitting on his daughter’s floor in the summer before I
graduated from his alma mater.
But now I’m reading it again, and it’s a reminder of what I still don’t know. The code
name, for example: he mentioned it in his Post essay in May, 1978, but Califano didn’t include it
in his memo. What wasn’t mentioned in either? The files were, apparently, “voluminous.” I have
the sentences and notes they chose to keep. Maybe there’s nothing else, or only things I could
read dumb twenty-first century conspiracy into. I don’t know. But it’s a funny last line, before the
sign-off. “It would be good for your image.”
***
Now it’s almost sixteen months since I first looked at the blue album my aunt sent me. I
know more, though some data’s still in the dark. What I do have is a more nuanced way of navigating the answers my grandfather might give me, if I were able to ask him questions.
Over the 1970s, my grandfather had to re-make his image within a new cultural frame.
He needed to articulate himself as more modern than his history suggested, at least to some, by
absolving himself of a scandalized, secretive past that suddenly implicated him. So he made personal and public efforts to both cleanse himself of a new generation’s idea of moral contamination, and to paint the context in which his old conduct would at least be understood—even if the
image came out sketchier than some would like.

!109
“No association” mixed with “normal contacts” mixed with the CIA’s attempts to “re-recruit.” His 1970s language gets confused, when it’s applied to old categories and relationships
whose definitions and borderlines were blurrier, when first defined, than the public demanded
them to be a few decades later. My suspicions might just live in the dark corners of semantics. In
the light, they might dry out to what I believe was my grandfather’s basic argument: some of the
things he did, and relationships he had, and places he worked, look bad to a later-day audience of
government skeptics. But he was a good journalist who cared about printing what he believed to
be the truth, and he’d built a career getting that truth from whatever sources he could. In hindsight, I can ask questions about his tactics; but maybe nothing he did ever really felt wrong, to
him. And if he reported over decades in which national ethics changed, and patriotism changed,
and his younger attitudes changed, too—can he blame his younger self for having been younger,
and having lived in a younger country?
I’m Geyelin’s granddaughter, and I’ve grown up in a house built from the wreckage of a
national moment he lived through. Its foundation is cemented in a certain suspicion of the government that he, at my age, was leaving college to go fight for. After finding what I’ve found, I
don’t know how many of his real ethics I’ve inherited; but I’ve at least developed the image I’ve
grown up with—that of my grandfather, with a pen, writing his understanding of the truth. I
know, now, a more complicated person. Or, at least, I’ve constructed one.
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